



Security Council

Distr.: General
16 November 2000

Original: English

**Letter dated 13 November 2000 from the Permanent
Representative of Georgia to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Peter Chkheidze
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 13 November 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

According to the information provided by a number of competent agencies on 8 and 9 November 2000, the Abkhaz "military forces" conducted training exercises in the restricted weapon zone, employing heavy armament (tanks, armoured combat vehicles, helicopters) and firing a number of missiles. The Abkhaz side impeded the international observers deployed in the conflict zone from surveying the restricted weapon zone and ignored their requests to meet with the "commanders of the units" participating in the exercises. In the course of the military manoeuvres, the air space of the territory was also closed.

The Abkhaz side deliberately violated commitments undertaken in the peace process, including the Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994 (S/1994/583, annex I and Corr.1) and the requirements of the Protocol of the meeting between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides in the Gali region on the stabilization of the situation in the security zone of 3 May 2000. Inaction on the part of the peacekeeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the given circumstances is also alarming.

The Georgian side condemns the aforesaid actions, which further stall the peace process, undermine exerted efforts of confidence-building between the parties and once again demonstrate the intentions of the Abkhaz side to complicate the situation in the conflict zone by means of provocation. The Georgian side again calls on the Abkhaz side to refrain from actions that undermine the results, even if minimal, achieved by the assistance of the international community in the process of conflict resolution. The Georgian side hopes the international community will intensify its efforts aimed at preventing such actions and achieving substantial progress in the peace process.

Tbilisi, 13 November 2000



**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.: General
17 November 2000

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**General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda items 114 (a) and (d)**

**Security Council
Fifty-fifth year**

**Human rights questions: implementation of human
rights instruments**

**Human rights questions: comprehensive implementation
of and follow-up to the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action**

**Letter dated 17 November 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit a statement issued today by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Eritrea in response to Ethiopia's false allegations of the existence of "hidden concentration camps" in Eritrea (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 114 (a) and (d), and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Tesfa Alem Seyoum
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the letter dated 17 November 2000 from the
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Eritrea to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

Press release

Ethiopia: fictional allegations as a backdoor to the peace process?

Early this week, the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry circulated a statement alleging the existence of "hidden concentration camps" and widespread abuse of the human rights of Ethiopians in Eritrea. In what is becoming a mendacious pattern, the authorities in Addis Ababa have gone so far as to produce fabricated lists and "testimonies" of Ethiopians victimized by this phantom campaign. What are the real facts?

In the first place, there are no "concentration or slave labour camps" in Eritrea as is alleged by Ethiopia's smear campaign. This has been ascertained by several intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and numerous representatives of governments, including Ambassador Bogosian, the special envoy of the United States Secretary of State to the Horn of Africa, who visited Ethiopia and Eritrea for the second time as late as last week, are among the independent bodies who have attested to this.

As far as the 3,000 or so Ethiopians stranded in two places (Ala and Afabet) are concerned, they are there because they were displaced or affected by Ethiopia's war of invasion. ICRC is involved in ensuring their safe repatriation, which has been obstructed in the past by Ethiopia's reluctance to receive its own nationals. The largely voluntary repatriation of Ethiopians was interrupted in July owing to Ethiopia's refusal to accept the access routes. Ethiopia's claims of some "30,000" Ethiopians incarcerated in over "70 concentration camps" is thus a sinister lie advanced to justify some ulterior motive.

Secondly, the Government of Eritrea has placed itself on record, through official communications to ICRC and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, for the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners, both civilian and military, by both sides with the assistance of ICRC. Progress on this matter remains blocked by Ethiopia's refusal to accept these basic tenets as provided for by the 18 June Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities (S/2000/601) and the Geneva Conventions. Only last week, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, when requested by ICRC to release Eritrean civilians incarcerated in the notorious Dediesa concentration camp for the last two and a half years, responded that his Government was only "ready to re-examine with flexibility the status of those detainees at Dediesa in line with progress in the peace process".

Indeed, Ethiopia's established record in its treatment of Eritrean civilians since the outbreak of the conflict is beyond the pale:

- Under an official policy, the authorities in Addis Ababa have, in turn, robbed, incarcerated and then deported over 75,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean heritage;
- Ethiopia detained, for up to one year, Eritrean university students on an exchange programme at Addis Ababa University. In contrast, Ethiopian

students studying in Eritrea in June 1998 were allowed to sit for their exams and then flown back to Addis Ababa;

- As stated above, about 1,500 young Eritrean civilians remain incarcerated in the brutal Dediesa prison camp and thousands more are unaccounted for. Last month the death of yet another young Eritrean in Dediesa, where many have perished under the harsh conditions, highlighted the horrendous situation those detainees face.

Moreover, Ethiopia continues to commit gross violations of international law in the occupied territories, as the following reports illustrate:

- Agence France Press and the South African Press Association on 27 June 2000 reported that "several Eritrean civilians were burned alive in their homes during looting by Ethiopian soldiers before they retreated from Guluj in the South-west of the country";
- The spokesperson for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in a press briefing note on 3 October similarly reported that "the town of Om Hajer was 50 per cent destroyed with virtually all public buildings trashed. The hospital and the school were partly destroyed while churches and mosques were looted of all the icons". In all these places, "everything of any value was taken away";
- More recently, human rights groups in Eritrea have documented countless cases of torture, rape and looting by Ethiopian forces in occupied Eritrea.

It is perfectly clear that it is Ethiopia and not Eritrea which stands accused of grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The Government of Ethiopia is engaged in this deception with the aim of covering up its crimes. Moreover, as the Government of Eritrea had underlined in its communications of 29 August, Ethiopia's smear campaign is motivated by:

- (a) Its unwillingness to receive its own nationals;
- (b) Its desire to create a sense of tension so as to delay or obstruct the deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping missions;
- (c) Its desire to create a "humanitarian pretext" for resorting to war.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asmara
17 November 2000

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
17 November 2000
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 17 November 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to my letters, the latest being the letter dated 10 November 2000 (document S/2000/1087 dated 10 November 2000), I have the honour to inform you that, at 1600 hours on 15 November 2000, on a public road in the village of Adaysah close to the border fence opposite Miskaf'am hill, as Lebanese citizen Abbas Husayn Sulayman, a native and resident of Kafr Kalla, was unloading rocks and rubble from a truck, Israeli forces fired a number of machine-gun rounds in his direction from their position on the above-mentioned hill, as a result of which he was wounded in the left shoulder and was immediately transported to Marjayoun hospital, where he underwent surgery.

This act of aggression constitutes a violation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and of the sovereignty of Lebanon, and comes within the framework of Israel's provocative violations which threaten stability in the southern region.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Selim Tadmoury**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
17 November 2000

Original: English

**Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force**

for the period from 23 May to 21 November 2000

I. Introduction

1. The present report gives an account of the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the last six months in pursuance of the mandate contained in Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and extended in subsequent resolutions, most recently resolution 1300 (2000) of 31 May 2000.

II. Situation in the area and activities of the Force

2. During the period under review, the ceasefire in the Israel-Syria sector was maintained and the area of operations of UNDOF remained calm. The Force supervised the area of separation by means of fixed positions and patrols to ensure that military forces of either party were excluded from it and also carried out fortnightly inspections of equipment and force levels in the areas of limitation. Liaison officers from the party concerned accompanied the inspection teams. Both sides denied inspection teams access to some of their positions and imposed some restrictions on the Force's freedom of movement.

3. The Force continued to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with facilities for mail and the passage of persons through the area of separation. Within the means available, medical treatment was provided to the local population on request. During the last six months, UNDOF assisted 531 students, 281 pilgrims, and 2 detainees in crossing through the area of separation. In addition, UNDOF provided protection at three Druze weddings.

4. In UNDOF's area of operation, especially in the area of separation, minefields continued to pose a threat to UNDOF personnel and local inhabitants. In consultation with the Syrian authorities, UNDOF instituted a minefield security and maintenance programme in the area of separation to identify and mark all minefields.

5. The Force Commander and his staff maintained close contact with the military liaison staffs of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. Both sides cooperated with the Force in the execution of its tasks.



6. As of 30 October 2000, UNDOF comprised 1,039 troops: from Austria (369), Canada (188), Japan (30), Poland (359) and Slovakia (93). In addition, 78 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) assisted the Force in carrying out its tasks. Major General Cameron Ross relinquished command of the Force on 7 July 2000. He was succeeded on 14 August by Major General Bo Wranger from Sweden. A map showing the deployment of the Force is attached to the present report.

III. Financial aspect

7. By its resolution 54/266 of 15 June 2000, the General Assembly appropriated the amount of \$37 million gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of \$3.1 million gross, for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2000 to 30 June 2001. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNDOF, the cost of maintaining the Force during the extension period would be limited to the monthly rate approved by the General Assembly.

8. As at 31 October 2000, unpaid assessments to the Special Account for UNDOF for the period since the inception of the Force until 30 November 2000 amounted to \$21.9 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at the same date amounted to \$2,095.1 million.

IV. Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

9. The Security Council, while deciding in resolution 1300 (2000) to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, also called upon the parties concerned to immediately implement resolution 338 (1973), and requested the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of the period, a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement that resolution. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and, in particular, the efforts undertaken at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973) were dealt with in the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East (A/54/495), which was submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions 53/37 and 53/38 of 2 December 1998.

V. Observations


10. The situation in the Israel-Syria sector has remained quiet. UNDOF, which was established in May 1974 to supervise the ceasefire called for by the Security Council and the agreement on disengagement between Syrian and Israeli forces of 31 May 1974, has continued to perform its function effectively, with the cooperation of the parties.

11. Despite the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle East continues to be potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached. I hope that determined efforts will be made by all concerned to tackle the problem in all its aspects, with a view to arriving at a just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973).

12. Under the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 31 May 2001. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel has also expressed its agreement.

13. In making this recommendation, I must draw attention to the shortfall in the funding of the Force. At present, unpaid assessments amount to some \$21.9 million. This sum represents money owed to the Member States that contribute the troops who make up the Force. I appeal to the Member States to pay their assessments promptly and in full and to clear all remaining arrears.

14. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Major General Ross and Major General Wrangler and to the men and women serving with UNDOF. They have performed with efficiency and devotion to duty the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops to UNDOF and to those that provide the UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force.



**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.: General
17 November 2000

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5

**Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem
and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory**

Security Council
Fifty-fifth year


**Identical letters dated 17 November 2000 from the Permanent
Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

In follow-up of my previous letters, dated 29 September through 15 November 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921; A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093), I am compelled to bring to your attention the fact that, since my last letter to you, the Israeli occupying forces have killed 11 more Palestinian civilians, including 8 children. This brings the total number of deaths in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, since 29 September 2000, to 205 Palestinians. (The names of the martyrs since my last letter are annexed.) The excessive and indiscriminate use of force by the Israeli occupying forces, including the use of tanks, helicopter gunships and other heavy weaponry, has also caused numerous more injuries among the Palestinian civilians, many of whom are in serious condition.

Furthermore, on 15 November 2000, Israeli helicopter missile fire in Beit Jala in the vicinity of the city of Bethlehem also killed a German national, Mr. Harald Fischer. In addition to his death, several foreigners, mostly correspondents, have been injured as a result of Israeli shelling and shooting during the last few weeks.

Such lethal incidents have occurred daily in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, as a result of the Israeli occupying forces' brutality and excessive use of force. For example, yesterday, a Palestinian man, age 55, was stopped at an Israeli checkpoint, where he got into a shouting exchange with Israeli soldiers and was then shot to death by the soldiers. This represents another specific instance of what human rights organizations have been referring to as the cold-blooded killing of Palestinian civilians.

In conjunction with this bloody Israeli military campaign against Palestinian civilians and the ongoing siege of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Government of Israel has just taken the decision to withhold money belonging to the



Palestinian Authority. In these circumstances of socio-economic hardship for the Palestinian people, such measures only exacerbate economic problems and worsen living conditions. This Israeli decision to withhold Palestinian money is tantamount to theft or at best is an illegal and unjustified tool of pressuring and collectively punishing the entire population.

The international community cannot allow this Israeli campaign of killing, terror and collective punishment against the Palestinian people to continue. It must insist on the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1322 (2000) and resolution ES-10/7 of 20 October 2000 of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly. We further reiterate once again our call to the Security Council for the urgent establishment of a United Nations protection force to be dispatched in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, for the purpose of providing much-needed protection for the Palestinian civilian population.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Nasser **Al-Kidwa**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

**Annex to the identical letters dated 17 November 2000 from the
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

**Names of martyrs killed by Israeli security forces in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem
(Wednesday, 15 November and Thursday, 16 November 2000)**

Wednesday, 15 November 2000

1. Ahmed Samir Bassil (15 years old)
2. Mohammed Nasser Mohammed Al-Sharafi (17 years old)
3. Samer Khairy Ahmed Khidr
4. Fathi Odeh Jumah Salem (18 years old)
5. Ahmed Saeed Shaban
6. Manee Jadou Abu Al-Kabash (16 years old)
7. Abdel Hafez Mohammed Gharouf (18 years old)
8. Ibrahim Abdel Raouf Jaidi (17 years old)

Thursday, 16 November 2000

1. Jihad Abu Shahmah (9 years old)
 2. Samer Al-Khadour (18 years old)
 3. Yussef Suleiman Ali Awad
-



Security Council

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Report of the Security Council Mission to East Timor and Indonesia

(9-17 November 2000)

I. Introduction

1. On 8 September 2000, the Security Council adopted resolution 1319 (2000). In his letter dated 25 October 2000 (S/2000/1030), the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had agreed to dispatch a Mission to East Timor and Indonesia from 9 to 18 November 2000. The terms of reference of the Mission were as follows:

(a) In East Timor, to review the progress in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1272 (1999);

(b) In Indonesia, to review the implementation of Security Council resolution 1319 (2000).

2. Following consultations among the members of the Security Council, it was decided that the composition of the Mission would be as follows:

Namibia (Ambassador Martin Andjaba, head of the Mission);

Argentina (Minister Luis Enrique Cappagli);

Malaysia (Ambassador Hasmy Agam);

Tunisia (Ambassador Othman Jerandi);

Ukraine (Ambassador Valeri P. Kuchynski);

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Ambassador Stewart Eldon);


United States of America (Ambassador Nancy Soderberg).

II. Activities of the Mission

3. Prior to the departure of the Mission, the members of the Mission met informally with representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and of Member States contributing military or civilian police personnel to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and with Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta, the East Timorese cabinet member for foreign affairs. The purpose of these meetings was to hear a broad range of views from other interested parties before the Mission's departure.

4. The Mission left New York on 9 November, and visited East Timor (12 and 13 November) at the invitation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator for East Timor, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, and West Timor and Jakarta (14-17 November) at the invitation of the Government of Indonesia. The members of the Mission expressed their gratitude to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNTAET officials, and to the Indonesian authorities, for facilitating the visit, which allowed them to see at first hand the situation in East Timor and the work of UNTAET, as well as the refugee situation in Kupang and Atambua.

5. In East Timor, the Mission held extensive discussions on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1272 (1999) and 1319 (2000) with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and senior civilian and military personnel in UNTAET, the



Cabinet of the East Timor Transitional Administration, the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL) Commander, nine diplomatic offices in East Timor (Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States), and East Timorese non-governmental organizations, as well as leading figures in East Timor, namely, Xanana Gusmao, Jose Ramos-Horta and Mario Carrascalao. In Dili, the Mission visited the site of the Santa Cruz massacre and laid wreaths to mark the ninth anniversary of the killings. Members of the Mission visited the district of Suai in Sector West, and received extensive briefings by UNTAET civilian and military personnel, met with representatives of the community, and visited the site of the 1999 Suai church massacre, and a hospital rehabilitation project.

6. In Kupang, the Mission met and had extensive discussions with the Governor of East Nusa Tenggara, which includes West Timor, Piet Tallo, the Udayana Military Commander, Major-General Kiki Syahakri, the Chief of Police of East Nusa Tenggara, Brigadier-General E Made Mangku Pastika, representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and local government, as well as non-governmental organizations. The Mission visited the regional police office to witness the destruction of a number of confiscated weapons, and the Noelbaki refugee camp. In Atambua, the Mission visited the Haliwen refugee camp as well as the Umaklaran resettlement site, and held discussions with representatives of civil society and non-governmental organizations. Members of the Mission laid flowers at the UNHCR office, in honour of those killed on 6 September 2000. They were briefed on the events leading to the murders. In Jakarta, the Mission met with Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri, and senior government officials, including the Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Speaker of the House of Representatives (DPR), Akbar Tandjung, Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alwi Shihab, as well as with representatives of the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM), the diplomatic community, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.

III. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1272 (1999)

A. Security and law and order

7. The overall security situation in East Timor is relatively stable, with remarkably little general crime. Civilian police have now been deployed to all districts and all but 10 subdistricts. Training of the Timor Lorosae Police Service continues; however, budgetary constraints mean that at the current rate of training, the requisite force of 3,000 will not be realized until 2006. Accordingly, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, has recommended that a portion of the peacekeeping assessed budget should be reallocated from the international police presence to accelerate the training of the East Timor national police force. Nonetheless, it is likely that there will be a need for international civilian police to remain beyond the date of independence. **The Mission recommends that this should be factored into planning for the United Nations presence that will follow UNTAET and also recommends that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other relevant United Nations organizations should give urgent consideration to assisting in speeding up the training of the Timor Lorosae Police Service.**

8. A vital element in developing an effective system of law and order will be the establishment of a fully functioning judicial system. This has proved challenging in light of the total absence of local capacity in this area and the other pressing priorities placed on UNTAET at the beginning of its operations. While UNTAET has made progress in developing a court administration system, prosecution services, public defender's system and prison services, the judicial sector remains seriously under-resourced. Consequently, the current system cannot process those suspects already in detention, some of whom have been held for almost a year. Moreover, UNTAET is facing significant difficulties in bringing to justice those responsible for the serious violations of human rights that occurred in East Timor in 1999. **In these circumstances, it is particularly important for UNTAET to consider all available ways of attracting the necessary resources and that decisions on handling serious crimes investigations should, to the extent possible, reflect East Timorese**

expectations. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General informed the Mission that he intended to conduct a review of the justice sector, and would propose a solution to this pressing issue including ways of addressing the shortage of expertise and financial resources. The Mission welcomed this timely initiative and urges the Security Council to give it priority consideration.

9. UNTAET has made substantial progress in addressing the security threat posed by militia infiltration from West Timor. Several months ago, up to 150 militia, in groups of 20 to 30, were operating in the western and central sectors. The peacekeeping force has taken robust and decisive action, greatly facilitated by information provided by the local population, to combat the militia. This has resulted in a reduction of militia activity inside East Timor and the exfiltration of a number of militia to West Timor. The Mission supports UNTAET's approach to this threat. However, the continuation of the refugee crisis in West Timor, the ongoing presence of militia elements in refugee camps and the possibility of further large-scale returns, which in all probability will include militia, continue to constitute a source of instability throughout Timor island. The East Timorese have expressed a desire to have their own defence force on independence, along the lines recommended in Option Three of the recent study made by King's College London. The Transitional Cabinet of East Timor recently endorsed the proposal for a 3,000-strong force as recommended. The modalities for implementing this proposal will be determined at a donors' meeting to be held in Dili on 21 to 23 November. **As with the police, however, it seems highly likely that East Timor will require an international military presence in some form for some time after independence. This, too, should be factored into planning for a United Nations follow-on presence.**

B. Humanitarian situation

10. The humanitarian situation has passed its most pressing phase. However, East Timor will need continued resources as people re-establish their livelihoods and as long as the prospect of large additional refugee returns remains. The Mission learned that UNTAET, together with humanitarian agencies, had put in place the necessary contingency plans to cope with a significant refugee influx. **It is**

vitaly important that this readiness should be maintained as a component of UNTAET's refugee return strategy.

C. An effective administration

11. UNTAET is now a mission in full swing. A particularly positive and important development in fulfilment of the mandate of capacity-building for self-governance has been the acceleration of the "Timorization" of the administration. This is steadily endowing the East Timorese with ownership of, and responsibility for, their own decision-making. A number of Timorese District or Deputy District Administrators have been appointed, while legislative responsibility is now exercised through the all-Timorese National Council and executive powers by a Transitional Cabinet comprising five Timorese and four internationals, under the chairmanship of the Transitional Administrator. **Several non-governmental organizations conveyed the need for Timorization to be actively taken forward at all levels of the administration. The Mission endorses UNTAET's efforts in this regard, while emphasizing the need for capacity-building among the East Timorese.**

12. It is foreseen that in the coming weeks, the Transitional Administration, through the Cabinet and National Council and in dialogue with the East Timorese leadership, will develop a timetable and mechanisms, inter alia, for the electoral process, to take East Timor to full independence. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General expressed the hope that the outcome of these discussions would be presented at the forthcoming donors' meeting in Brussels.

D. Infrastructure

13. There has been major rehabilitation of public buildings and utilities in Dili, the capital and population centre of East Timor. The Mission was told that the education system is functioning throughout East Timor, together with a basic level of health care in many areas. However, the overall state of East Timor's infrastructure remains devastated. Matters of particular concern for the Mission were both the small amounts so far expended on reconstruction and the uneven rate of progress of the rest of the country compared with

Dili, particularly with regard to road reconstruction, power supply and the reconstruction of buildings. The Mission learned that while some funding was available for outstanding infrastructure needs, implementation of projects had been slow to materialize. This area requires a priority focus. In this regard, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General highlighted the need to have resources made immediately available for some urgent work of reconstruction (for example, of court buildings) and recommended that this be provided from the assessed budget, given the broad nature of UNTAET's mandate. **The Mission recommends that consideration be given to increased flexibility in the use of assessed resources allocated to complex peacekeeping operations such as UNTAET.**

E. Concluding comments

14. The Mission, and particularly those members who had visited East Timor during the last Security Council Mission in the wake of the Popular Consultation, was impressed by the progress made in implementing the mandate given to UNTAET in little over one year. However, this progress has not always been smooth. The Mission does not underestimate either the current difficulties in areas such as reconstruction and administration of justice, or the enormity of the challenges that remain in the lead-up to independence projected for the latter half of 2001. The Mission renewed its full support for the work of UNTAET. It also noted that the Council will soon have to take a decision on the extension of UNTAET's mandate through to independence. **It further recognizes that in all likelihood there will be a need for a strong international commitment to East Timor after independence, inter alia, through the provision of financial, technical and security assistance, if the aspirations of the East Timorese are to be fully realized. Planning for this should begin as soon as possible.**

15. The Mission would like to express appreciation for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General's invitation to the Security Council to visit East Timor and see at first hand how UNTAET's mandate is being implemented. The Mission found this to be a rewarding experience highlighting the dedication of both international personnel and East Timorese to working together to realize the aspirations

of the people of East Timor, in the face of many challenges.

IV. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1319 (2000)

16. Many of the hundreds of thousands of East Timorese displaced in the violence following the 1999 Popular Consultation have returned to East Timor to establish their place in the community. Indonesian Ministers assured the Mission of their Government's commitment to resolving the refugee issue. Their assurances are welcome. But more than one year later, an estimated 120,000 remain in refugee camps in West Timor. Indonesian Ministers assured the Mission of their commitment to resolving the refugee issue. International efforts to resolve this crisis were hampered by the murder of three UNHCR personnel in Atambua on 6 September. In response to their tragic deaths, the Security Council adopted resolution 1319 (2000) which sought ways to bring about an immediate end to the interrelated problems of the refugee crisis and the security threat posed by the presence of militia. The Council Mission was able to gain a good first-hand appreciation of the complexity of the situation.

A. The refugee situation

17. In paragraph 4 of resolution 1319 (2000), the Security Council called on the Indonesian authorities to take immediate and effective measures to ensure the safe return of the refugees who chose to go back to East Timor. The situation of the refugees in the camps in West Timor remains a cause of great concern. The Mission received reports by returning refugees to East Timor that militias continue to intimidate and spread misinformation in the camps. Further reports indicated that refugees were being made to hand over money and livestock in order to be allowed to return to East Timor. With a view to obtaining first-hand information, the Mission visited two refugee camps: Noelbaki near Kupang and Haliwen in Atambua. The Mission saw truly depressing conditions in which the refugees lived.

18. The Mission was struck by the lack of information on the conditions in East Timor, the extent of misinformation inside the camps and the clear potential for intimidation. Some of the refugees with whom the Mission met were concerned about the safety

and security situation in East Timor and the reception accorded to the returnees. The Mission sought to allay concerns by reiterating to refugees and community leaders that East Timorese leaders had given assurances that there would be security and safety for refugees upon their return, while emphasizing that those who had committed crimes during the turmoil in 1999 and subsequently would have to face the East Timorese legal system. Some refugees openly stated to the Mission that they would go back to East Timor only "with the red-and-white flag", implying Indonesian rule. **The Mission suggests that the Government of Indonesia work with UNTAET to develop and implement an effective and impartial information strategy to allow the refugees to make a voluntary and informed decision about their futures and to bring home to them that the result of the Popular Consultation must be accepted.**

19. The repatriation or relocation of refugees has become a pressing issue, given the plight of refugees in the dilapidated camps. The Mission noted that in order to deal with the issue, the Government of Indonesia has set up an inter-ministerial task force, which has already begun pilot registration projects, and the establishment of resettlement sites for those who choose to remain in Indonesia. One of these sites was visited by the Mission. **The Mission expresses its strong view that registration process should be apolitical thus precluding any role for pro-integration groups. For registration to be credible, there must be involvement of international personnel, in particular from UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), a view shared by the Government of Indonesia. In accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1319 (2000), the Mission reiterates that UNHCR and other agencies will not be able to return to West Timor until security can be guaranteed, including real progress towards disarming and disbanding the militia. The Mission recommends that a team of security experts be dispatched by the United Nations to West Timor in cooperation with the Government of Indonesia to assess the security situation and to establish contacts with the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI), the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) and other relevant parties. This would be in accordance with the usual modalities employed by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator to assess an area prior to any rerating of its security level.**

20. **The Mission also underscores that all stages of the return process must be carried out in safety and security without harassment, intimidation or extortion. It welcomes the intention of the Government of Indonesia to begin discussions shortly with the United Nations offices in Jakarta on arrangements to facilitate an assessment by United Nations security experts of the situation in West Timor. Recognizing that the Government of Indonesia will require financial assistance to resettle those refugees who choose to stay in Indonesia, the Mission welcomes the proposal that potential international donors visit West Timor, once security has been restored.**

21. UNTAET, the Government of Indonesia, UNHCR, IOM and the East Timorese leadership are developing plans for a pilot programme for the return of ex-TNI reservists from East Timor (MILSAS) and their families. The success of this programme may trigger others to follow suit. **The Mission recommends that UNTAET and the Government of Indonesia should actively pursue the possibility of other such ad hoc returns.**

22. **The Mission recommends that the outstanding issue of payment of pensions to former civil servants be resolved by Indonesia's commitment to honour outstanding pension obligations regardless of whether the beneficiaries choose to reside in Indonesia or East Timor. This would serve as a catalyst to encourage their return to East Timor to play a part in the Timorization of the administration and reintegrate fully into society.**

B. Security

23. Security Council resolution 1319 (2000) calls for the Government of Indonesia to take immediate additional steps, in fulfilment of its responsibilities, to disarm and disband the militia, restore law and order in the affected areas in West Timor, ensure safety and security in the refugee camps and for humanitarian workers, and prevent cross-border incursions into East Timor. During its visit to West Timor, the Mission was briefed on the efforts by the Government of Indonesia to fulfil these requirements. Measures taken include the deployment of additional security forces to conduct operations to disarm and collect weapons. The Mission witnessed the destruction of a number of these weapons. It was also apprised of the continued

detention of Eurico Guterres and six individuals allegedly involved in the UNHCR murders, and the progress of the investigations into those killings. **The Mission strongly hopes that these and other investigations of parties responsible for violent attacks and intimidation in East and West Timor will move swiftly through the Indonesian justice system.**

24. In a meeting with the Mission, Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri, informed the Mission of the Government of Indonesia's commitment to work with the United Nations to resolve residual issues that arise during the transition period; Ministers had been instructed to work with the Mission to give new impetus to the relationship. Later the same day, the Mission met with the Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and other Indonesian Government officials, who asserted that the militia had been disbanded in the sense that they no longer trained or operated in an organized fashion and that their structures and organization (Pro-integration Armed Forces P.P.I.) had been disabled in 1999. The Minister acknowledged ongoing intimidation by militia, whom he described as ex-militia elements, present in and around the refugee camps. Minister Yudhoyono stressed his commitment to focus on its eradication and undertook to report to the Security Council on Indonesia's plans for action to secure this objective. **The Mission welcomes this commitment, encourages further efforts and looks forward to the Coordinating Minister's report.**

25. In the Mission's opinion, based on the reports from recent returnees to East Timor from West Timor, and its discussions with refugees in the camps, the continued presence of militia, in whatever form, continues to be an impediment to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1319 (2000). **The Mission stresses the need for decisive action to deal with the remaining militias, in particular the leaders, to put an end to their activities once and for all, inter alia, through ongoing disarmament operations, separation of militia leaders and those engaging in intimidation from refugee communities, and the expeditious prosecution of militia leaders for the serious crimes they have committed. The Mission encourages efforts by all parties to isolate hard-line militia elements, in full accordance with the law.**

26. With the endorsement of the Mission, UNTAET met recently with three of the four militia leaders who have written two letters to the President of the Council and who appear to be seeking to return unconditionally to East Timor. **The Mission encourages a dialogue to facilitate their return, which could lead to substantial returns, and welcomes the Government of Indonesia's efforts to facilitate this matter.**

27. In both the immediate and long term, arrangements for close cooperation between the security services in both East and West Timor are essential to manage and contain the security situation. Useful relationships, both formal and informal, already exist between the peacekeeping force and the Indonesian military. **The Mission recommends that these relationships are further developed, and that a system of information exchange be established between the POLRI in West Timor and the UNTAET civilian police and Office of Human Rights Affairs, including taking action to follow up on information provided by UNHCR and UNTAET on alleged cases of intimidation. It welcomes efforts made so far by the Indonesian security forces in implementing its obligation to prevent cross-border incursions into East Timor and emphasizes the need for further efforts in this regard.**

C. Justice and reconciliation

28. One of the Mission's priorities was to focus on efforts to bring to justice the perpetrators of serious crimes committed in East Timor, as called for in Security Council resolutions 1272 (1999) and 1319 (2000) and on many other occasions by the Council. There are two parallel tracks, the first in East Timor and the second in Indonesia.

29. The Mission has noted shortcomings in the implementation of justice in East Timor (see above), given the absence of any capacity in this field when UNTAET started up. **It urged that measures be undertaken to address this problem in order to respond sufficiently to the expectation of East Timorese for justice.** Failure to cope with this challenge could have a negative impact on the country's ability to promote reconciliation and embrace a national political culture based on respect for human rights and accountability.

30. During the visit to Indonesia, the Mission conveyed its concern over the slow pace of the process in Indonesia to bring to justice the perpetrators of the 1999 campaign of violence in East Timor, including those who had organized and directed the atrocities. The Government of Indonesia reaffirmed its commitment to pursuing the investigations and prosecutions as a matter of priority. Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman informed the Mission that he expected the first trials to begin in January or February 2001. He confirmed that the trial of the pro-integration militia leader, Eurico Guterres, and those charged with the murder of the three UNHCR workers in Atambua, would take place in Jakarta in the near future. He also clarified that Guterres, inter alia, faced charges in connection with the incitement of violence and the violence committed in East Timor in 1999. The Attorney-General, as well as the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM), confirmed that the necessary legislation for the establishment of a human rights tribunal had been passed by the Parliament. The Attorney-General expressed appreciation for the technical assistance being provided by the United Nations on the basis of the offer made by the Secretary-General during his visit to Indonesia in February 2000, as well as the bilateral assistance of individual Governments. **The Mission welcomes this law and awaits the early establishment of the ad hoc courts.** Minister Darusman also indicated his intention to work closely with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and to establish a referral commission that included international experts. **The Mission welcomed this effort and recommended consideration of his request for international expertise.** Both in West Timor and in Jakarta, the Mission emphasized the need to pursue and arrest those responsible for the deaths of United Nations peacekeepers Privates Leonard William Manning and Devi Ram Jaishi in East Timor. The Mission is concerned over the lack of progress in opening an investigation into the murder of Private Jaishi. The Mission regrets that thus far there has been no progress in bringing the perpetrators to justice and conveys its strong expectation that there should be progress soon.

31. Reconciliation among the East Timorese has important implications for the return and reintegration of refugees, long-term political and social harmony in East Timor and good relations between East Timor and Indonesia. The Mission was impressed by the persistent

effort being made by UNTAET to open the channels of dialogue with pro-integration East Timorese in West Timor. The Mission notes the efforts made by the Government of Indonesia in this area. It is regrettable that all these initiatives have not yet produced a satisfactory response from the pro-integration camp.

32. In meetings in Dili with the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) leadership, as well as community leaders engaged in an effort to establish a national reconciliation mechanism, the Mission was assured of their readiness to reconcile with those on the other side of the political divide while insisting that persons who might have committed serious crimes in East Timor should be brought to justice. The Mission urges East Timorese political and community leaders to continue their efforts to reassess pro-integration East Timorese of their readiness to reconcile.

33. While in Kupang, some members of the Mission met with representatives from UNTAS (Uni Timor Aswain), a political organization supporting East Timor's integration with West Timor. While this organization purports to represent the views of the refugees, there is no evidence to suggest that this is the case in reality. During this meeting, the representatives renounced violence and condemned the murders of the UNHCR workers. They continued, however, to reject the outcome of the Popular Consultation. The representatives of UNTAS stated to members of the Mission their commitment to reconciliation but insisted that this proceed without preconditions. In response, members of the Mission underlined that the question of justice for serious crimes and the results of the Popular Consultation could not be ignored if there was to be a lasting process of reconciliation. They also urged the pro-integration group to accept the reality of the independence of East Timor, thereby contributing to the reconciliation process. **The Mission encourages the Government of Indonesia to assist in securing public denunciations of violence as a means of pursuing political goals, as well as acceptance of the results of the Popular Consultation.**

34. However, reconciliation should not be limited only to political leaders. The delegation strongly encouraged community leaders in East Timor and East Timorese community leaders now in West Timor to establish direct community-to-community contacts with a view to building confidence and facilitating wider reconciliation. In this regard, **the recent joint initiative of Bishop Basilio do Nascimento of**

Baucau and Bishop Anton Ratu of Atambua to facilitate contacts between East Timorese in East Timor and refugee groups in West Timor is a commendable effort that should be fully supported.

D. Relations between Indonesia, UNTAET and East Timor

35. In its meetings in East Timor and Indonesia, the Mission encouraged the reinvigoration of bilateral talks between UNTAET and the Government of Indonesia on the practical implementation of a number of issues agreed to in the communiqué of 29 February 2000, signed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Foreign Affairs Minister Shihab. While there has been welcome progress on a number of these issues, **the Mission is strongly of the view that the establishment and effective functioning of bilateral mechanisms are fundamental to fully normalizing relations between Indonesia and East Timor. The Mission also views as important the establishment of a land corridor between the Oecussi enclave and contiguous East Timor and urges the Government of Indonesia to work with UNTAET towards establishing an effective transit arrangement. It hopes that future meetings of the Joint Border Commission will contribute to achieving these objectives.**

36. The Mission offered to the Government of Indonesia some elements designed to give new impetus to various aspects of the complex relationship among Indonesia, UNTAET and East Timor. In addition to making a number of practical suggestions designed to reinforce existing mechanisms for cooperation, the elements covered a number of the main issues dealt with elsewhere in the present report. The Government of Indonesia agreed that a meeting of the Joint Border Commission should take place in November with a view to preparing for a subsequent meeting in December. Discussions on modalities will now proceed with UNTAET. They also indicated that they would shortly initiate discussions with the United Nations offices in Jakarta to facilitate an assessment by the United Nations security experts of the situation in West Timor. At the conclusion of the Mission, a joint press conference was held in Jakarta on 17 November, at which Foreign Affairs Minister Shihab and the head of the Mission, Ambassador Andjaba, issued press statements (see annexes I and II).

37. The Mission reiterates its thanks to UNTAET and the Government of Indonesia for the hospitality accorded to it throughout these visits.

Annex I**Statement to the press by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia on the visit of the Mission of the Security Council****(17 November 2000)**

1. I should like to begin by expressing my own personal, as well as the Government of Indonesia's satisfaction in receiving the visit by the Mission of the Security Council over the past four days. Our invitation to the Mission and your positive response testify to the positive line of communication between the Council and the Government of Indonesia in dealing with issues of common concern relating to the transition period in East Timor. Hence, it is to no one's surprise that a genuine spirit of friendship and cooperation has permeated throughout the Mission's visit.

2. Its two days of activities in Kupang and Atambua, followed by the past two days in Jakarta, will no doubt have given the Security Council Mission ample opportunity to witness first-hand the important strides that have been made by Indonesia in responding to Council resolution 1319 (2000). During the Kupang and Atambua phase of its visit, the Mission worked closely with, in addition to central government representatives, the representatives of the local government, and police as well as the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) regional command. In Jakarta, the Mission met with government ministers, with high-ranking officials and also, notably, with the Speaker of the House of Representatives (DPR). Just as important were the intensive contacts with the members of the civil society and also the meeting in Kupang with representatives of Uni Timor Aswain (UNTAS).

3. Over the course of this visit, numerous issues of concern were discussed. Permit me to highlight some areas of interest, namely:

(a) The need for sustained and enhanced efforts by the Government of Indonesia, UNTAET and the international community to urgently and comprehensively overcome the question of East Timorese refugees which has brought complex ramifications;

(b) The need for renewed concerted efforts by all concerned to address the various factors behind the East Timorese refugees issue, inter alia, security and safety in the camps and uncertainty about the situation in East Timor. Indonesia for its part will continue to take steps to further enhance the security conditions in the camps. My Government also deems it important that better and more complete information be provided to the refugees about the prevailing situation in East Timor in order to address their expressed concerns about their future safety and security in East Timor;

(c) The importance of cooperation between the Government of Indonesia and relevant international humanitarian agencies in facilitating the registration of the refugees as a way to determine whether their intention is to return to East Timor or to remain in Indonesia based on the principle of freedom of choice. In the meantime, Indonesia will continue to facilitate ad hoc ("spontaneous") return of East Timorese refugees. Since 6 September 2000, some 1,400 such refugees have returned to East Timor;

(d) The need for the resumption of international assistance to the refugees to supplement the efforts of the Government of Indonesia;

(e) The importance of the ongoing as well as any possible future legal processes against those responsible for the killings of the three Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff as well as against those who have committed serious crimes in the past in East Timor and those who have carried out intimidation against the refugees;

(f) The need for continued and enhanced talks between the Government of Indonesia and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on residual issues that arise during the transition period. This involves, inter alia, putting into effect existing mechanisms for cooperation, including the Joint Border Committee which plans to convene a director-level meeting in the last week of November with a view to convening its first meeting during December;

(g) The need to intensively consider ways and means to facilitate and promote reconciliation among East Timorese which is vital for the future peace and stability of East Timor.

4. Finally, I should like to once again reaffirm the commitment of my Government to continuing this positive line of communication with the United Nations Security Council as reflected by the visit of the Mission.

Annex II

Statement by Ambassador Martin Andjaba, leader of the United Nations Security Council Mission to East Timor and Indonesia

(Jakarta, 17 November 2000)

The Security Council Mission visited West Timor and Jakarta from 14 to 17 November 2000 at the invitation of the Government of Indonesia, following a visit to East Timor. Members of the Mission expressed their gratitude to the Indonesian authorities for facilitating the visit, which allowed them to see at first hand the refugee situation in Kupang and Atambua. The discussions throughout were productive and welcome.

The Mission welcomes the efforts the Government of Indonesia is making to address the situation in West Timor. However, much remains to be done and the international community is prepared to work in cooperation with Indonesia to meet the remaining challenges.

In East Timor, the Mission was impressed by the progress made since 1999. They commended the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) staff on the accomplishments of UNTAET, and it commends the people of East Timor in their historic transition.

Over the past year, East Timor has begun rebuilding, over 170,000 refugees have returned, and the process of reconciliation is beginning. The Mission emphasizes that the twin tracks of justice and reconciliation are key to resolution of the present situation.

The Mission noted the efforts of the Government of Indonesia to resolve the refugee issue. It welcomed the steps taken by Indonesia towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1319 (2000), which calls, inter alia, for the immediate disarmament and disbandment of the militia. It is clear that the refugee problem raises complex issues. There is a pressing need to work together to facilitate the earliest possible registration, repatriation and resettlement of all the refugees, in conditions of safety and security.

The Mission was glad to hear that several hundred refugees had returned in recent weeks. However, information from refugees returning to East Timor indicates that intimidation is still present in the camps in West Timor. The intimidation must be stopped. Many refugees are saying they are frightened that they still do not have a free choice about their own future, and security in the camps remains uncertain. Furthermore, decisive action is necessary to deal with the remaining militias. The Mission welcomed the Government of Indonesia's commitment to addressing the problem of continued intimidation in the camps.

Members of the Mission expressed the hope that the cases of Eurico Guterres and those responsible for the murders of three Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff would proceed quickly. It also underscored the international community's interest in speedy progress in bringing to

justice those responsible for the deaths of the three UNHCR staff and two United Nations peacekeepers, and for the events of 1999.

The Mission took note of the request of the Indonesian Attorney-General, Marzuki Darusman, for international assistance in ensuring adequate expertise in bringing to justice those responsible for human rights violations. The Mission welcomes the passage of the recent human rights law and awaits the early establishment of the ad hoc courts. Mr. Darusman also indicated his intention to work closely with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and to establish a referral commission that included international experts. The Mission welcomed this effort and recommended consideration of his specific request.

There was agreement on the high priority of resuming international assistance to the refugees to supplement the efforts of the Government of Indonesia. For this to happen, the security of international humanitarian workers will need to be assured. The Government of Indonesia will be discussing with the United Nations offices in Jakarta arrangements to facilitate an assessment by United Nations security experts of the situation in West Timor, in cooperation with the police, the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and other responsible authorities.

The Mission underscored the importance of internationally observed registration of the refugees, a view which is shared by the Government of Indonesia. Those refugees who want to stay and those who want to return must be given fair treatment and support. The Mission encouraged the Government to promulgate a detailed plan for registration, return and resettlement. The Mission also encourages continued discussions on this issue with UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

The Mission believes that ad hoc returns, under international supervision, can be an important factor in helping to creating the conditions necessary for resolving the issue. In this context, it welcomes plans for the imminent return of the ex-TNI reservists from East Timor (MILSAS) group.

The Mission welcomed the statements by East Timorese leaders that they were anxious to welcome the refugees back and to pursue reconciliation. The Mission emphasizes the importance of providing better information to the refugees, and of supporting efforts by church and other communities to achieve this.

Both sides stressed the need for continued and enhanced talks between the Government of Indonesia and UNTAET on residual issues that will arise during the transition period. This involves, inter alia, putting into effect existing mechanisms for cooperation, including the Joint Border Commission. The Mission welcomes the Government of Indonesia's willingness to hold a meeting of the Joint Border Commission in November.

The Mission will be making its report to the Security Council on 20 November 2000.

**Security Council**

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**Report of the Security Council Mission to East Timor
and Indonesia**

(9-17 November 2000)

I. Introduction

1. On 8 September 2000, the Security Council adopted resolution 1319 (2000). In his letter dated 25 October 2000 (S/2000/1030), the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had agreed to dispatch a Mission to East Timor and Indonesia from 9 to 18 November 2000. The terms of reference of the Mission were as follows:

(a) In East Timor, to review the progress in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1272 (1999);

(b) In Indonesia, to review the implementation of Security Council resolution 1319 (2000).

2. Following consultations among the members of the Security Council, it was decided that the composition of the Mission would be as follows:

Namibia (Ambassador Martin Andjaba, head of the Mission);

Argentina (Minister Luis Enrique Cappagli);

Malaysia (Ambassador Hasmy Agam);

Tunisia (Ambassador Othman Jerandi);

Ukraine (Ambassador Valeri P. Kuchynski);

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Ambassador Stewart Eldon);

United States of America (Ambassador Nancy Soderberg).

II. Activities of the Mission

3. Prior to the departure of the Mission, the members of the Mission met informally with representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and of Member States contributing military or civilian police personnel to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and with Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta, the East Timorese cabinet member for foreign affairs. The purpose of these meetings was to hear a broad range of views from other interested parties before the Mission's departure.

4. The Mission left New York on 9 November, and visited East Timor (12 and 13 November) at the invitation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator for East Timor, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, and West Timor and Jakarta (14-17 November) at the invitation of the Government of Indonesia. The members of the Mission expressed their gratitude to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNTAET officials, and to the Indonesian authorities, for facilitating the visit, which allowed them to see at first hand the situation in East Timor and the work of UNTAET, as well as the refugee situation in Kupang and Atambua.

5. In East Timor, the Mission held extensive discussions on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1272 (1999) and 1319 (2000) with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and senior civilian and military personnel in UNTAET, the Cabinet of the East Timor Transitional Administration, the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East

* Reissued for technical reasons.



Timor (FALINTIL) Commander, ten diplomatic offices in East Timor (Australia, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States), and East Timorese non-governmental organizations, as well as leading figures in East Timor, namely, Xanana Gusmao, Jose Ramos-Horta and Mario Carrascalao. In Dili, the Mission visited the site of the Santa Cruz massacre and laid wreaths to mark the ninth anniversary of the killings. Members of the Mission visited the district of Suai in Sector West, and received extensive briefings by UNTAET civilian and military personnel, met with representatives of the community, and visited the site of the 1999 Suai church massacre, and a hospital rehabilitation project.

6. In Kupang, the Mission met and had extensive discussions with the Governor of East Nusa Tenggara, which includes West Timor, Piet Tallo, the Udayana Military Commander, Major-General Kiki Syahakri, the Chief of Police of East Nusa Tenggara, Brigadier-General E Made Mangku Pastika, representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and local government, as well as non-governmental organizations. The Mission visited the regional police office to witness the destruction of a number of confiscated weapons, and the Noelbaki refugee camp. In Atambua, the Mission visited the Haliwen refugee camp as well as the Umaklaran resettlement site, and held discussions with representatives of civil society and non-governmental organizations. Members of the Mission laid flowers at the UNHCR office, in honour of those killed on 6 September 2000. They were briefed on the events leading to the murders. In Jakarta, the Mission met with Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri, and senior government officials, including the Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Speaker of the House of Representatives (DPR), Akbar Tandjung, Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alwi Shihab, as well as with representatives of the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM), the diplomatic community, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.

III. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1272 (1999)

A. Security and law and order

7. The overall security situation in East Timor is relatively stable, with remarkably little general crime. Civilian police have now been deployed to all districts and all but 10 subdistricts. Training of the Timor Lorosae Police Service continues; however, budgetary constraints mean that at the current rate of training, the requisite force of 3,000 will not be realized until 2006. Accordingly, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, has recommended that a portion of the peacekeeping assessed budget should be reallocated from the international police presence to accelerate the training of the East Timor national police force. Nonetheless, it is likely that there will be a need for international civilian police to remain beyond the date of independence. **The Mission recommends that this should be factored into planning for the United Nations presence that will follow UNTAET and also recommends that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other relevant United Nations organizations should give urgent consideration to assisting in speeding up the training of the Timor Lorosae Police Service.**

8. A vital element in developing an effective system of law and order will be the establishment of a fully functioning judicial system. This has proved challenging in light of the total absence of local capacity in this area and the other pressing priorities placed on UNTAET at the beginning of its operations. While UNTAET has made progress in developing a court administration system, prosecution services, public defender's system and prison services, the judicial sector remains seriously under-resourced. Consequently, the current system cannot process those suspects already in detention, some of whom have been held for almost a year. Moreover, UNTAET is facing significant difficulties in bringing to justice those responsible for the serious violations of human rights that occurred in East Timor in 1999. **In these circumstances, it is particularly important for UNTAET to consider all available ways of attracting the necessary resources and that decisions on handling serious crimes investigations should, to the extent possible, reflect East Timorese**

expectations. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General informed the Mission that he intended to conduct a review of the justice sector, and would propose a solution to this pressing issue including ways of addressing the shortage of expertise and financial resources. The Mission welcomed this timely initiative and urges the Security Council to give it priority consideration.

9. UNTAET has made substantial progress in addressing the security threat posed by militia infiltration from West Timor. Several months ago, up to 150 militia, in groups of 20 to 30, were operating in the western and central sectors. The peacekeeping force has taken robust and decisive action, greatly facilitated by information provided by the local population, to combat the militia. This has resulted in a reduction of militia activity inside East Timor and the exfiltration of a number of militia to West Timor. The Mission supports UNTAET's approach to this threat. However, the continuation of the refugee crisis in West Timor, the ongoing presence of militia elements in refugee camps and the possibility of further large-scale returns, which in all probability will include militia, continue to constitute a source of instability throughout Timor island. The East Timorese have expressed a desire to have their own defence force on independence, along the lines recommended in Option Three of the recent study made by King's College London. The Transitional Cabinet of East Timor recently endorsed the proposal for a 3,000-strong force as recommended. The modalities for implementing this proposal will be determined at a donors' meeting to be held in Dili on 21 to 23 November. **As with the police, however, it seems highly likely that East Timor will require an international military presence in some form for some time after independence. This, too, should be factored into planning for a United Nations follow-on presence.**

B. Humanitarian situation

10. The humanitarian situation has passed its most pressing phase. However, East Timor will need continued resources as people re-establish their livelihoods and as long as the prospect of large additional refugee returns remains. The Mission learned that UNTAET, together with humanitarian agencies, had put in place the necessary contingency plans to cope with a significant refugee influx. **It is**

vitally important that this readiness should be maintained as a component of UNTAET's refugee return strategy.

C. An effective administration

11. UNTAET is now a mission in full swing. A particularly positive and important development in fulfilment of the mandate of capacity-building for self-governance has been the acceleration of the "Timorization" of the administration. This is steadily endowing the East Timorese with ownership of, and responsibility for, their own decision-making. A number of Timorese District or Deputy District Administrators have been appointed, while legislative responsibility is now exercised through the all-Timorese National Council and executive powers by a Transitional Cabinet comprising five Timorese and four internationals, under the chairmanship of the Transitional Administrator. **Several non-governmental organizations conveyed the need for Timorization to be actively taken forward at all levels of the administration. The Mission endorses UNTAET's efforts in this regard, while emphasizing the need for capacity-building among the East Timorese.**

12. It is foreseen that in the coming weeks, the Transitional Administration, through the Cabinet and National Council and in dialogue with the East Timorese leadership, will develop a timetable and mechanisms, inter alia, for the electoral process, to take East Timor to full independence. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General expressed the hope that the outcome of these discussions would be presented at the forthcoming donors' meeting in Brussels.

D. Infrastructure

13. There has been major rehabilitation of public buildings and utilities in Dili, the capital and population centre of East Timor. The Mission was told that the education system is functioning throughout East Timor, together with a basic level of health care in many areas. However, the overall state of East Timor's infrastructure remains devastated. Matters of particular concern for the Mission were both the small amounts so far expended on reconstruction and the uneven rate of progress of the rest of the country compared with

Dili, particularly with regard to road reconstruction, power supply and the reconstruction of buildings. The Mission learned that while some funding was available for outstanding infrastructure needs, implementation of projects had been slow to materialize. This area requires a priority focus. In this regard, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General highlighted the need to have resources made immediately available for some urgent work of reconstruction (for example, of court buildings) and recommended that this be provided from the assessed budget, given the broad nature of UNTAET's mandate. **The Mission recommends that consideration be given to increased flexibility in the use of assessed resources allocated to complex peacekeeping operations such as UNTAET.**

E. Concluding comments

14. The Mission, and particularly those members who had visited East Timor during the last Security Council Mission in the wake of the Popular Consultation, was impressed by the progress made in implementing the mandate given to UNTAET in little over one year. However, this progress has not always been smooth. The Mission does not underestimate either the current difficulties in areas such as reconstruction and administration of justice, or the enormity of the challenges that remain in the lead-up to independence projected for the latter half of 2001. The Mission renewed its full support for the work of UNTAET. It also noted that the Council will soon have to take a decision on the extension of UNTAET's mandate through to independence. **It further recognizes that in all likelihood there will be a need for a strong international commitment to East Timor after independence, inter alia, through the provision of financial, technical and security assistance, if the aspirations of the East Timorese are to be fully realized. Planning for this should begin as soon as possible.**

15. The Mission would like to express appreciation for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General's invitation to the Security Council to visit East Timor and see at first hand how UNTAET's mandate is being implemented. The Mission found this to be a rewarding experience highlighting the dedication of both international personnel and East Timorese to working together to realize the aspirations

of the people of East Timor, in the face of many challenges.

IV. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1319 (2000)

16. Many of the hundreds of thousands of East Timorese displaced in the violence following the Popular Consultation have returned to East Timor to re-establish their place in the community. Indonesian Ministers assured the Mission of their Government's commitment to resolving the refugee issue. Their assurances are welcome. But more than one year later, an estimated 120,000 remain in refugee camps in West Timor. Indonesian Ministers assured the Mission of their commitment to resolving the refugee issue. International efforts to resolve this crisis were halted by the murder of three UNHCR personnel in Atambua on 6 September. In response to their tragic deaths, the Security Council adopted resolution 1319 (2000) which sought ways to bring about an immediate end to the interrelated problems of the refugee crisis and the security threat posed by the presence of militia. The Council Mission was able to gain a good first-hand appreciation of the complexity of the situation.

A. The refugee situation

17. In paragraph 4 of resolution 1319 (2000), the Security Council called on the Indonesian authorities to take immediate and effective measures to ensure the safe return of the refugees who chose to go back to East Timor. The situation of the refugees in the camps in West Timor remains a cause of great concern. The Mission received reports by returning refugees to East Timor that militias continue to intimidate and spread misinformation in the camps. Further reports indicated that refugees were being made to hand over money and livestock in order to be allowed to return to East Timor. With a view to obtaining first-hand information, the Mission visited two refugee camps: Noelbaki near Kupang and Haliwen in Atambua. The Mission saw the truly depressing conditions in which the refugees live.

18. The Mission was struck by the lack of information on the conditions in East Timor, the extent of misinformation inside the camps and the clear potential for intimidation. Some of the refugees with whom the Mission met were concerned about the safety

and security situation in East Timor and the reception accorded to the returnees. The Mission sought to allay concerns by reiterating to refugees and community leaders that East Timorese leaders had given assurances that there would be security and safety for refugees upon their return, while emphasizing that those who had committed crimes during the turmoil in 1999 and subsequently would have to face the East Timorese legal system. Some refugees openly stated to the Mission that they would go back to East Timor only "with the red-and-white flag", implying Indonesian rule. **The Mission suggests that the Government of Indonesia work with UNTAET to develop and implement an effective and impartial information strategy to allow the refugees to make a voluntary and informed decision about their futures and to bring home to them that the result of the Popular Consultation must be accepted.**

19. The repatriation or relocation of refugees has become a pressing issue, given the plight of refugees in the dilapidated camps. The Mission noted that in order to deal with the issue, the Government of Indonesia has set up an inter-ministerial task force, which has already begun pilot registration projects, and the establishment of resettlement sites for those who choose to remain in Indonesia. One of these sites was visited by the Mission. **The Mission expresses its strong view that registration process should be apolitical thus precluding any role for pro-integration groups. For registration to be credible, there must be involvement of international personnel, in particular from UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), a view shared by the Government of Indonesia. In accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1319 (2000), the Mission reiterates that UNHCR and other agencies will not be able to return to West Timor until security can be guaranteed, including real progress towards disarming and disbanding the militia. The Mission recommends that a team of security experts be dispatched by the United Nations to West Timor in cooperation with the Government of Indonesia to assess the security situation and to establish contacts with the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI), the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) and other relevant parties. This would be in accordance with the usual modalities employed by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator to assess an area prior to any rerating of its security level.**

20. **The Mission also underscores that all stages of the return process must be carried out in safety and security without harassment, intimidation or extortion. It welcomes the intention of the Government of Indonesia to begin discussions shortly with the United Nations offices in Jakarta on arrangements to facilitate an assessment by United Nations security experts of the situation in West Timor. Recognizing that the Government of Indonesia will require financial assistance to resettle those refugees who choose to stay in Indonesia, the Mission welcomes the proposal that potential international donors visit West Timor, once security has been restored.**

21. UNTAET, the Government of Indonesia, UNHCR, IOM and the East Timorese leadership are developing plans for a pilot programme for the return of ex-TNI reservists from East Timor (MILSAS) and their families. The success of this programme may trigger others to follow suit. **The Mission recommends that UNTAET and the Government of Indonesia should actively pursue the possibility of other such ad hoc returns.**

22. **The Mission recommends that the outstanding issue of payment of pensions to former civil servants be resolved by Indonesia's commitment to honour outstanding pension obligations regardless of whether the beneficiaries choose to reside in Indonesia or East Timor. This would serve as a catalyst to encourage their return to East Timor to play a part in the Timorization of the administration and reintegrate fully into society.**

B. Security

23. Security Council resolution 1319 (2000) calls for the Government of Indonesia to take immediate additional steps, in fulfilment of its responsibilities, to disarm and disband the militia, restore law and order in the affected areas in West Timor, ensure safety and security in the refugee camps and for humanitarian workers, and prevent cross-border incursions into East Timor. During its visit to West Timor, the Mission was briefed on the efforts by the Government of Indonesia to fulfil these requirements. Measures taken include the deployment of additional security forces to conduct operations to disarm and collect weapons. The Mission witnessed the destruction of a number of these weapons. It was also apprised of the continued

detention of Eurico Guterres and six individuals allegedly involved in the UNHCR murders, and the progress of the investigations into those killings. **The Mission strongly hopes that these and other investigations of parties responsible for violent attacks and intimidation in East and West Timor will move swiftly through the Indonesian justice system.**

24. In a meeting with the Mission, Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri, informed the Mission of the Government of Indonesia's commitment to work with the United Nations to resolve residual issues that arise during the transition period; Ministers had been instructed to work with the Mission to give new impetus to the relationship. Later the same day, the Mission met with the Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and other Indonesian Government officials, who asserted that the militia had been disbanded in the sense that they no longer trained or operated in an organized fashion and that their structures and organization (Pro-integration Armed Forces P.P.I.) had been disabled in 1999. The Minister acknowledged ongoing intimidation by militia, whom he described as ex-militia elements, present in and around the refugee camps. Minister Yudhoyono stressed his commitment to focus on its eradication and undertook to report to the Security Council on Indonesia's plans for action to secure this objective. **The Mission welcomes this commitment, encourages further efforts and looks forward to the Coordinating Minister's report.**

25. In the Mission's opinion, based on the reports from recent returnees to East Timor from West Timor, and its discussions with refugees in the camps, the continued presence of militia, in whatever form, continues to be an impediment to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1319 (2000). **The Mission stresses the need for decisive action to deal with the remaining militias, in particular the leaders, to put an end to their activities once and for all, inter alia, through ongoing disarmament operations, separation of militia leaders and those engaging in intimidation from refugee communities, and the expeditious prosecution of militia leaders for the serious crimes they have committed. The Mission encourages efforts by all parties to isolate hard-line militia elements, in full accordance with the law.**

26. With the endorsement of the Mission, UNTAET met recently with three of the four militia leaders who have written two letters to the President of the Council and who appear to be seeking to return unconditionally to East Timor. **The Mission encourages a dialogue to facilitate their return, which could lead to substantial returns, and welcomes the Government of Indonesia's efforts to facilitate this matter.**

27. In both the immediate and long term, arrangements for close cooperation between the security services in both East and West Timor are essential to manage and contain the security situation. Useful relationships, both formal and informal, already exist between the peacekeeping force and the Indonesian military. **The Mission recommends that these relationships are further developed, and that a system of information exchange be established between the POLRI in West Timor and the UNTAET civilian police and Office of Human Rights Affairs, including taking action to follow up on information provided by UNHCR and UNTAET on alleged cases of intimidation. It welcomes efforts made so far by the Indonesian security forces in implementing its obligation to prevent cross-border incursions into East Timor and emphasizes the need for further efforts in this regard.**

C. Justice and reconciliation

28. One of the Mission's priorities was to focus on efforts to bring to justice the perpetrators of serious crimes committed in East Timor, as called for in Security Council resolutions 1272 (1999) and 1319 (2000) and on many other occasions by the Council. There are two parallel tracks, the first in East Timor and the second in Indonesia.

29. The Mission has noted shortcomings in the implementation of justice in East Timor (see above), given the absence of any capacity in this field when UNTAET started up. **It urged that measures be undertaken to address this problem in order to respond sufficiently to the expectation of East Timorese for justice.** Failure to cope with this challenge could have a negative impact on the country's ability to promote reconciliation and embrace a national political culture based on respect for human rights and accountability.

30. During the visit to Indonesia, the Mission conveyed its concern over the slow pace of the process in Indonesia to bring to justice the perpetrators of the 1999 campaign of violence in East Timor, including those who had organized and directed the atrocities. The Government of Indonesia reaffirmed its commitment to pursuing the investigations and prosecutions as a matter of priority. Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman informed the Mission that he expected the first trials to begin in January or February 2001. He confirmed that the trial of the pro-integration militia leader, Eurico Guterres, and those charged with the murder of the three UNHCR workers in Atambua, would take place in Jakarta in the near future. He also clarified that Guterres, inter alia, faced charges in connection with the incitement of violence and the violence committed in East Timor in 1999. The Attorney-General, as well as the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM), confirmed that the necessary legislation for the establishment of a human rights tribunal had been passed by the Parliament. The Attorney-General expressed appreciation for the technical assistance being provided by the United Nations on the basis of the offer made by the Secretary-General during his visit to Indonesia in February 2000, as well as the bilateral assistance of individual Governments. **The Mission welcomes this law and awaits the early establishment of the ad hoc courts.** Minister Darusman also indicated his intention to work closely with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and to establish a referral commission that included international experts. **The Mission welcomed this effort and recommended consideration of his request for international expertise.** Both in West Timor and in Jakarta, the Mission emphasized the need to pursue and arrest those responsible for the deaths of United Nations peacekeepers Privates Leonard William Manning and Devi Ram Jaishi in East Timor. The Mission is concerned over the lack of progress in opening an investigation into the murder of Private Jaishi. The Mission regrets that thus far there has been no progress in bringing the perpetrators to justice and conveys its strong expectation that there should be progress soon.

31. Reconciliation among the East Timorese has important implications for the return and reintegration of refugees, long-term political and social harmony in East Timor and good relations between East Timor and Indonesia. The Mission was impressed by the persistent

effort being made by UNTAET to open the channels of dialogue with pro-integration East Timorese in West Timor. The Mission notes the efforts made by the Government of Indonesia in this area. It is regrettable that all these initiatives have not yet produced a satisfactory response from the pro-integration camp.

32. In meetings in Dili with the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) leadership, as well as community leaders engaged in an effort to establish a national reconciliation mechanism, the Mission was assured of their readiness to reconcile with those on the other side of the political divide while insisting that persons who might have committed serious crimes in East Timor should be brought to justice. The Mission urges East Timorese political and community leaders to continue their efforts to reassess pro-integration East Timorese of their readiness to reconcile.

33. While in Kupang, some members of the Mission met with representatives from UNTAS (Uni Timor Aswain), a political organization supporting East Timor's integration with West Timor. While this organization purports to represent the views of the refugees, there is no evidence to suggest that this is the case in reality. During this meeting, the representatives renounced violence and condemned the murders of the UNHCR workers. They continued, however, to reject the outcome of the Popular Consultation. The representatives of UNTAS stated to members of the Mission their commitment to reconciliation but insisted that this proceed without preconditions. In response, members of the Mission underlined that the question of justice for serious crimes and the results of the Popular Consultation could not be ignored if there was to be a lasting process of reconciliation. They also urged the pro-integration group to accept the reality of the independence of East Timor, thereby contributing to the reconciliation process. **The Mission encourages the Government of Indonesia to assist in securing public denunciations of violence as a means of pursuing political goals, as well as acceptance of the results of the Popular Consultation.**

34. However, reconciliation should not be limited only to political leaders. The delegation strongly encouraged community leaders in East Timor and East Timorese community leaders now in West Timor to establish direct community-to-community contacts with a view to building confidence and facilitating wider reconciliation. In this regard, **the recent joint initiative of Bishop Basilio do Nascimento of**

Baucau and Bishop Anton Ratu of Atambua to facilitate contacts between East Timorese in East Timor and refugee groups in West Timor is a commendable effort that should be fully supported.

37. The Mission reiterates its thanks to UNTAET and the Government of Indonesia for the hospitality accorded to it throughout these visits.

D. Relations between Indonesia, UNTAET and East Timor

35. In its meetings in East Timor and Indonesia, the Mission encouraged the reinvigoration of bilateral talks between UNTAET and the Government of Indonesia on the practical implementation of a number of issues agreed to in the communiqué of 29 February 2000, signed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Foreign Affairs Minister Shihab. While there has been welcome progress on a number of these issues, **the Mission is strongly of the view that the establishment and effective functioning of bilateral mechanisms are fundamental to fully normalizing relations between Indonesia and East Timor. The Mission also views as important the establishment of a land corridor between the Oecussi enclave and contiguous East Timor and urges the Government of Indonesia to work with UNTAET towards establishing an effective transit arrangement. It hopes that future meetings of the Joint Border Commission will contribute to achieving these objectives.**

36. The Mission offered to the Government of Indonesia some elements designed to give new impetus to various aspects of the complex relationship among Indonesia, UNTAET and East Timor. In addition to making a number of practical suggestions designed to reinforce existing mechanisms for cooperation, the elements covered a number of the main issues dealt with elsewhere in the present report. The Government of Indonesia agreed that a meeting of the Joint Border Commission should take place in November with a view to preparing for a subsequent meeting in December. Discussions on modalities will now proceed with UNTAET. They also indicated that they would shortly initiate discussions with the United Nations offices in Jakarta to facilitate an assessment by the United Nations security experts of the situation in West Timor. At the conclusion of the Mission, a joint press conference was held in Jakarta on 17 November, at which Foreign Affairs Minister Shihab and the head of the Mission, Ambassador Andjaba, issued press statements (see annexes I and II).

Annex I**Statement to the press by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia on the visit of the Mission of the Security Council****(17 November 2000)**

1. I should like to begin by expressing my own personal, as well as the Government of Indonesia's satisfaction in receiving the visit by the Mission of the Security Council over the past four days. Our invitation to the Mission and your positive response testify to the positive line of communication between the Council and the Government of Indonesia in dealing with issues of common concern relating to the transition period in East Timor. Hence, it is to no one's surprise that a genuine spirit of friendship and cooperation has permeated throughout the Mission's visit.

2. Its two days of activities in Kupang and Atambua, followed by the past two days in Jakarta, will no doubt have given the Security Council Mission ample opportunity to witness first-hand the important strides that have been made by Indonesia in responding to Council resolution 1319 (2000). During the Kupang and Atambua phase of its visit, the Mission worked closely with, in addition to central government representatives, the representatives of the local government, and police as well as the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) regional command. In Jakarta, the Mission met with government ministers, with high-ranking officials and also, notably, with the Speaker of the House of Representatives (DPR). Just as important were the intensive contacts with the members of the civil society and also the meeting in Kupang with representatives of Uni Timor Aswain (UNTAS).

3. Over the course of this visit, numerous issues of concern were discussed. Permit me to highlight some areas of interest, namely:

(a) The need for sustained and enhanced efforts by the Government of Indonesia, UNTAET and the international community to urgently and comprehensively overcome the question of East Timorese refugees which has brought complex ramifications;

(b) The need for renewed concerted efforts by all concerned to address the various factors behind the East Timorese refugees issue, inter alia, security and safety in the camps and uncertainty about the situation in East Timor. Indonesia for its part will continue to take steps to further enhance the security conditions in the camps. My Government also deems it important that better and more complete information be provided to the refugees about the prevailing situation in East Timor in order to address their expressed concerns about their future safety and security in East Timor;

(c) The importance of cooperation between the Government of Indonesia and relevant international humanitarian agencies in facilitating the registration of the refugees as a way to determine whether their intention is to return to East Timor or to remain in Indonesia based on the principle of freedom of choice. In the meantime, Indonesia will continue to facilitate ad hoc ("spontaneous") return of East Timorese refugees. Since 6 September 2000, some 1,400 such refugees have returned to East Timor;

(d) The need for the resumption of international assistance to the refugees to supplement the efforts of the Government of Indonesia;

(e) The importance of the ongoing as well as any possible future legal processes against those responsible for the killings of the three Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff as well as against those who have committed serious crimes in the past in East Timor and those who have carried out intimidation against the refugees;

(f) The need for continued and enhanced talks between the Government of Indonesia and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on residual issues that arise during the transition period. This involves, inter alia, putting into effect existing mechanisms for cooperation, including the Joint Border Committee which plans to convene a director-level meeting in the last week of November with a view to convening its first meeting during December;

(g) The need to intensively consider ways and means to facilitate and promote reconciliation among East Timorese which is vital for the future peace and stability of East Timor.

4. Finally, I should like to once again reaffirm the commitment of my Government to continuing this positive line of communication with the United Nations Security Council as reflected by the visit of the Mission.

Annex II

Statement by Ambassador Martin Andjaba, leader of the United Nations Security Council Mission to East Timor and Indonesia

(Jakarta, 17 November 2000)

The Security Council Mission visited West Timor and Jakarta from 14 to 17 November 2000 at the invitation of the Government of Indonesia, following a visit to East Timor. Members of the Mission expressed their gratitude to the Indonesian authorities for facilitating the visit, which allowed them to see at first hand the refugee situation in Kupang and Atambua. The discussions throughout were productive and welcome.

The Mission welcomes the efforts the Government of Indonesia is making to address the situation in West Timor. However, much remains to be done and the international community is prepared to work in cooperation with Indonesia to meet the remaining challenges.

In East Timor, the Mission was impressed by the progress made since 1999. They commended the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) staff on the accomplishments of UNTAET, and it commends the people of East Timor in their historic transition.

Over the past year, East Timor has begun rebuilding, over 170,000 refugees have returned, and the process of reconciliation is beginning. The Mission emphasizes that the twin tracks of justice and reconciliation are key to resolution of the present situation.

The Mission noted the efforts of the Government of Indonesia to resolve the refugee issue. It welcomed the steps taken by Indonesia towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1319 (2000), which calls, inter alia, for the immediate disarmament and disbandment of the militia. It is clear that the refugee problem raises complex issues. There is a pressing need to work together to facilitate the earliest possible registration, repatriation and resettlement of all the refugees, in conditions of safety and security.

The Mission was glad to hear that several hundred refugees had returned in recent weeks. However, information from refugees returning to East Timor indicates that intimidation is still present in the camps in West Timor. The intimidation must be stopped. Many refugees are saying they are frightened that they still do not have a free choice about their own future, and security in the camps remains uncertain. Furthermore, decisive action is necessary to deal with the remaining militias. The Mission welcomed the Government of Indonesia's commitment to addressing the problem of continued intimidation in the camps.

Members of the Mission expressed the hope that the cases of Eurico Guterres and those responsible for the murders of three Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff would proceed quickly. It also underscored the international community's interest in speedy progress in bringing to

justice those responsible for the deaths of the three UNHCR staff and two United Nations peacekeepers, and for the events of 1999.

The Mission took note of the request of the Indonesian Attorney-General, Marzuki Darusman, for international assistance in ensuring adequate expertise in bringing to justice those responsible for human rights violations. The Mission welcomes the passage of the recent human rights law and awaits the early establishment of the ad hoc courts. Mr. Darusman also indicated his intention to work closely with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and to establish a referral commission that included international experts. The Mission welcomed this effort and recommended consideration of his specific request.

There was agreement on the high priority of resuming international assistance to the refugees to supplement the efforts of the Government of Indonesia. For this to happen, the security of international humanitarian workers will need to be assured. The Government of Indonesia will be discussing with the United Nations offices in Jakarta arrangements to facilitate an assessment by United Nations security experts of the situation in West Timor, in cooperation with the police, the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and other responsible authorities.

The Mission underscored the importance of internationally observed registration of the refugees, a view which is shared by the Government of Indonesia. Those refugees who want to stay and those who want to return must be given fair treatment and support. The Mission encouraged the Government to promulgate a detailed plan for registration, return and resettlement. The Mission also encourages continued discussions on this issue with UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

The Mission believes that ad hoc returns, under international supervision, can be an important factor in helping to creating the conditions necessary for resolving the issue. In this context, it welcomes plans for the imminent return of the ex-TNI reservists from East Timor (MILSAS) group.

The Mission welcomed the statements by East Timorese leaders that they were anxious to welcome the refugees back and to pursue reconciliation. The Mission emphasizes the importance of providing better information to the refugees, and of supporting efforts by church and other communities to achieve this.

Both sides stressed the need for continued and enhanced talks between the Government of Indonesia and UNTAET on residual issues that will arise during the transition period. This involves, inter alia, putting into effect existing mechanisms for cooperation, including the Joint Border Commission. The Mission welcomes the Government of Indonesia's willingness to hold a meeting of the Joint Border Commission in November.

The Mission will be making its report to the Security Council on 20 November 2000.

the Chief Executive of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

5. During the Ninth Summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which took place in Doha, Qatar, on 12 and 13 November 2000, I participated in several discussions on the issue of Afghanistan, in particular with the Heads of State of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan. My Personal Representative also attended the Ninth Summit and took part in several of my meetings in Doha.

6. Immediately following his appointment on 1 February 2000, my Personal Representative embarked on his first visit to Afghanistan, as well as to the countries which are members of the "six plus two" group on Afghanistan. In the initial stage, Mr. Vendrell focused on familiarizing himself with the situation in and around Afghanistan and on listening to the views of the Afghan parties as well as of the Governments of the "six plus two" group and other concerned and interested Governments. At a subsequent stage, while developing and strengthening his contacts, he began to evolve, in coordination with his interlocutors, some idea as to how a peace process, under the auspices of the United Nations, might be structured.

7. In Kabul and Kandahar, which my Personal Representative has visited on several occasions, his main interlocutor has been the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Taliban, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil. In addition, on 5 September, Mr. Vendrell met with the Taliban supreme leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, and on other occasions with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, the Governor of Kandahar Province, Mullah Hassan Rahmani, the Taliban Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mullah Abdul Jalil, and, more recently, with the Minister of Education, Amir Khan Muttaqi, who has been appointed the Taliban's chief negotiator. In Faizabad, Dushanbe, Tashkent and New York, Mr. Vendrell has had frequent meetings with leaders of the United Front, including the President of the Islamic State, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. A. Abdullah, and Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. My Personal Representative and his staff have also maintained regular contacts with other anti-Taliban commanders, including General Abdul Rashid Dostum, leader of the Jumbesh-e Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan, Mohammad Ismail Khan, the former Governor of Herat who escaped from a Kandahar

prison in late March, and Professor Karim Khalili, leader of the Shiite Hazara faction Hezb-e Wahdat.

8. Topics covered in my Personal Representative's talks have included the repeated demands by the Security Council in its various resolutions and statements for an immediate ceasefire; the non-targeting of the civilian population in the course of the fighting; other humanitarian and human rights matters; issues of terrorism and poppy cultivation; and the views of his interlocutors on the establishment of a broadly based, multi-ethnic and representative government. The discussions have also touched on relations with third countries. In this connection, each side has vehemently complained about persistent outside interference in support of the other side.

9. In discussing these issues, both sides have expressed their willingness to consider a negotiated solution to the conflict, although, as an alternative, the Taliban authorities have also cited the political surrender of or a military victory over their opponents. Both sides have expressed their opposition to terrorism, with the Taliban frequently stressing that the territory of Afghanistan would not be used to carry out attacks against other nations.

10. Regarding the demand of the Security Council, contained in resolution 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999, that the Taliban turn over Osama bin Laden without delay, the Taliban reiterated its position that Mr. bin Laden took up residence when Afghanistan was under the control of the previous regime and that there was not sufficient evidence linking him to specific terrorist acts. The Taliban authorities have made it clear that they consider Mr. bin Laden as their guest and that the customs of Pashtoon hospitality do not allow for his expulsion from the country. The Taliban claim that Mr. bin Laden has no means to carry out such activities outside Afghan territory. As an alternative to his voluntary departure, an option which the Taliban authorities have at times said they would foster, the Taliban again proposed that he be tried in Afghanistan by a court composed of ulemas drawn from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and a third Islamic country.

11. On the issue of a ceasefire, my Personal Representative has formed the impression that, despite their stated willingness to consider such a move, neither side has in reality ruled out future military activities; that any ceasefire arrived at would risk being

short-lived, particularly in the absence of verification; and that it could easily degenerate into a trade of accusations about violations to the detriment of mutual confidence and serious negotiations.

12. Most recently, my Personal Representative has concentrated his efforts on securing an agreement by the two warring parties to initiate a process of dialogue. On 30 October 2000, in separate letters addressed to my Personal Representative, both the Taliban and the United Front agreed to enter into a process of dialogue under my good offices aimed at bringing about, in the shortest possible time, an end to the armed conflict in Afghanistan through political means (see A/55/548-S/2000/1077, annexes I and II). They have also agreed that this process should be conducted either through direct meetings between the two sides, either with my active participation or that of my Personal Representative, or indirectly through my intermediation or that of my Personal Representative. Notable in the agreement is the commitment of the two sides to participate in the dialogue with serious intent and in good faith; and not to abandon the process unilaterally, but rather to pursue it without interruption until the negotiating agenda, to be agreed by the two sides, is exhausted.

13. Following this agreement, my Personal Representative has begun to shuttle between the two sides to discuss elements for the negotiating agenda. In the event that he considers that there is sufficient basis for an eventual agreement, he would schedule a meeting of the two sides, possibly before the end of 2000. In the meantime, the Taliban authorities have appointed the Minister of Education, Amir Khan Muttaqi, as head of their negotiating team, while the United Front has indicated that Acting Foreign Minister Abdullah will conduct the negotiations on their side.

14. My Personal Representative has met on two separate occasions this year, in June and October, with the former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, and members of his entourage to exchange views on the situation in Afghanistan and to discuss the former King's ideas on how a *loya jirga*, a traditional grand assembly, could be convened inside Afghanistan. He has also held a series of meetings in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Germany with independent Afghan personalities, including many who support the ex-King's proposal for the convening of an emergency *loya jirga*. I wish to take this opportunity to

stress that clearly the criterion for participation in the shaping of Afghanistan's future cannot be the holding of weapons, but that non-fighting Afghans, both inside and outside the country, have much to contribute and need to be involved in deciding the ultimate destiny of their country.

15. In the contacts that my Personal Representative has had with members of the "six plus two" group and other concerned Governments, they have expressed their frustration with the continued war in Afghanistan and the absence of a political settlement. They view international terrorism, illicit drug production/trafficking and extremism emanating from Afghanistan as a serious threat to regional stability. Many have strongly criticized the Taliban for its apparent determination to press a military solution, which, those Governments asserted, was an unachievable and unacceptable option. Others consider a Taliban victory inevitable and are consequently of the opinion that the international community should start engaging the Taliban in the expectation that this might lead to changes in the Taliban's policies and behaviour. All have nonetheless acknowledged the central role of the United Nations in the resolution of the Afghan issue and have reiterated their full support both for my efforts and for those of my Personal Representative.

16. Mr. Vendrell has maintained close contact with the Governments of Afghanistan's neighbours, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and has held several meetings, on which I have already reported, with their leaders. Most recently, Mr. Vendrell met with the Foreign Ministers of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as with the Special Presidential Envoy of Turkmenistan on Afghanistan and with senior officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan, including the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan. During his latest visit to Tehran on 8 and 9 October, Mr. Vendrell discussed the issue of Afghanistan at length with the Chief of the Afghan Headquarters, Ibrahim Taherian, as well as with the Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Mohsen Aminzadeh and Javad Zarif.

17. The focus of my Personal Representative's discussions has been the implications for regional and international security of the situation in Afghanistan, the prospects for peace, the means of achieving a lasting settlement, the question of human rights,

terrorism and drug production/trafficking. All his interlocutors pledged their cooperation in assisting the United Nations to establish a peace process between the Afghan parties. On 3 November, my Personal Representative and the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Afghanistan briefed the Security Council on their activities.

B. Activities of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan, including the Civil Affairs Unit

18. During the reporting period, UNSMA strengthened its political presence in the region with the opening of a liaison office in Tehran and the reopening of a political office in Kabul. The Civil Affairs Unit has become operational, with offices in six locations in Afghanistan. UNSMA's military component has been reinvigorated and it is my intention to restore it to its previous strength of four, with the Senior Military Adviser stationed in Islamabad, one adviser based in Afghanistan, one in Tajikistan, covering the north of Afghanistan, and the fourth rotating as required.

Civil Affairs Unit

19. The primary objective of the Civil Affairs Unit of UNSMA, as defined in Security Council resolution 1214 (1998), is to monitor the situation, promote and support respect for minimum humanitarian standards and deter massive and systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. In order to achieve this objective, the Unit, which functions like civil affairs components of other United Nations operations, combines elements of information-gathering with human rights observation through its presence inside Afghanistan. In doing so, the Unit also assists the Personal Representative in carrying out the good offices of the Secretary-General by promoting a better understanding and knowledge of the needs and demands of the Afghan people and providing vital information that will help him develop an agenda more responsive to those needs and demands. It is only through the building of contacts and greater familiarity with the needs of the people that the United Nations can become more effective in pursuing its peacemaking activities. This year, the first full year of the Unit's existence, has clearly been one of an exploratory

nature, laying the foundations for deeper involvement with the Afghan people.

20. With the recent opening of an office in Mazar-e-Sharif, the Unit's nationwide deployment is complete in the six major urban centres, Faizabad, Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul and Kandahar. The Unit would also like to open an office in Bamyan in order to observe the situation on the ground in the central highlands more closely. Missions have meanwhile been deployed to the Hazarajat and Ghor regions in the central highlands. The Unit is currently composed of a Coordinator and seven Civil Affairs Officers; the recruitment of four more officers is expected to be completed by the end of 2000. By early 2001, UNSMA should achieve its aim of stationing two Civil Affairs Officers in each of its main duty stations in Afghanistan.

21. Working inside the country, the Civil Affairs Officers are attempting to build up and strengthen an ongoing persuasive dialogue with Afghan authorities at both the regional and local levels in areas such as administration, the law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and the media, with a view to fostering human rights awareness among these key groups.

22. In engaging Afghan civil society, Civil Affairs Officers have pursued contacts with women's groups, youth organizations, private and non-governmental organization (NGO)-run media, religious leaders, intellectuals and *shuras* (traditional assemblies of local notables). They have monitored and reported on political, social, economic and cultural trends, including highlights on the human rights situation in Afghanistan, and are also studying areas such as administration, judiciary, legislature, constitution, media and economic activities in order to better map the current and future situation of Afghanistan and to respond to the needs of Afghans. A significant decline in the already largely insufficient financial and human resources allocated to the civil sector has been recorded nationwide.

III. Recent developments in Afghanistan

A. Military situation

23. This year the fighting season started earlier than usual. The Taliban, with their superiority in number

and logistics, took the initiative from the outset. The intensity of this year's fighting indicates that the flow of arms and other war-making materiel into Afghanistan continued unabated and, during the last few months, even rose to new levels. Reports suggest that the presence of non-Afghan fighters, mainly from Pakistan, is significant. The season's full-scale fighting started in the north of Kabul with two vigorous offensives by the Taliban forces on 1 and 9 July. Detailed descriptions of the fighting during the spring and summer periods were given in my previous reports to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

24. In September and early October the victorious Taliban forces secured wider areas around Taloqan and embarked upon a series of attacks to the north, capturing the districts of Khwajaghar, Dashti Archi and Emam Saheb in Takhar Province. At this point, Badakhshan Province was the sole province left entirely under control of the United Front.

25. On 14 October, the United Front launched a successful counterattack at a moment when the Taliban forces were rotating units and releasing the veterans from seven weeks of sustained fighting, replacing them with fresh units. The districts of Emam Saheb, Dashti Archi and Emam Saheb were rapidly recaptured and the United Front forces advanced towards Taloqan from the east and north. After 10 days of progress, the United Front counter-offensive ebbed and the Taliban was able to push the attacking forces back. As of 5 November, the confrontation lines were more or less the same as at 13 October, and the situation appeared to have developed into a stalemate.

26. The Taliban campaign in Baghlan/Takhar engaged around 13,000 to 15,000 Taliban fighters after reinforcement, while less than half that figure fought on the side of the United Front. The fight for Taloqan in particular was tense. Both sides sustained heavy losses in terms of people killed, wounded or captured, estimated in total at 6,000 to 9,000; 65 per cent of those casualties can be attributed to the Taliban forces.

27. This year's military setback put the United Front under intense pressure. A series of meetings were hurriedly convened with the evident purpose of saving the alliance from disintegrating and inviting non-United Front commanders to join the fight against the Taliban. Apart from a reported meeting between the two Uzbek commanders, Generals Dostum and Abdul Malik, in the eastern Iranian city of Masshad earlier in

the year, two potentially significant encounters among key anti-Taliban commanders Massoud, Dostum and Ismail Khan took place in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in October and November, as a response to the perception of increased foreign support to the Taliban. It was agreed at their first meeting that the United Front would establish a new military council, to include themselves and other key commanders.

28. Winning over the loyalty of opponents and switching sides has been part of the civil war in Afghanistan. On 25 July, the Taliban arrested Mohammad Bashir Baghlani, the Governor of Baghlan Province and one of the Taliban's key allies in northern Afghanistan, on charges that he had established secret contacts with the opposition. The arrest triggered clashes between the Taliban and the United Front. Shortly afterwards, Abdullah Jan Wahidi, the former Governor of Laghman Province, who had announced his alliance with the Taliban in a publicized ceremony in late April, defected back to the United Front. In late August, it was reported that differences had developed between the Governor of the central province of Bamyan, Maulawi Islam, and the Taliban. There have been reports since mid-July of infighting among the United Front leadership in areas adjacent to Faizabad, the provincial capital of Badakhshan.

B. Political situation

Regional issues

29. The conflict in Afghanistan is having an increasing impact on the situation in Central and South Asia. Afghanistan's neighbours and countries farther afield are worried about spill-over effects from the ongoing fighting between the Taliban and the United Front.

30. The President of the United States of America, Bill Clinton, visited India and Pakistan in March. During his visit to Islamabad, Mr. Clinton discussed the question of terrorism and the continued presence in Afghanistan of Osama bin Laden with Pakistan's Chief Executive Pervez Musharraf. These issues as well as those related to peace and human rights in Afghanistan have been the object of further discussions between Pakistan and the United States, including those held during the visit to Islamabad, in late May, of Thomas Pickering, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and the visits by Karl Inderfurth, Assistant

Secretary of State, and Michael Sheehan, Head of the Office of Counter-Terrorism of the State Department, on several occasions in 2000.

31. In September, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, dispatched a Special Envoy, Sergei Yastrebzhemsky, to Islamabad for discussions on Afghanistan with senior Pakistani officials, including Chief Executive Musharraf and General Mahmud Ahmad, Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). During his visit to India in October, President Putin agreed with Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to coordinate efforts to counter terrorism in the region, in particular that emanating from Afghanistan. An Indian and Russian working group has already been formed in this regard.

32. The United States and the Russian Federation held two rounds of high-level talks, in Washington, D.C., in August and in Moscow in October, to exchange views on the situation in Afghanistan. It has been reported that after the second round in Moscow, the two countries agreed to put international pressure on the Taliban. The Taliban authorities rejected the claim that they posed a threat to stability in the Central Asian region.

33. The Central Asian States remain on high alert with regard to the situation in Afghanistan. In mid-April, the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan met at Tashkent and signed an agreement on joint action to fight terrorism as well as political, religious and other kinds of extremism and international organized crime, of which Afghanistan was perceived to be the source. The Russian Federation expressed its increasing concern about the Taliban's alleged support for the Chechen rebels inside and outside Afghanistan. All these concerns have been strongly rejected by the Taliban.

34. In October 2000, a summit meeting was held in Bishkek by States (with the exception of Uzbekistan) parties to accords signed on 24 May 2000 in Minsk, reinvigorating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) collective security treaty to counter terrorism and extremism. The purpose of the summit meeting, in which the Presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan participated, was to discuss a long-term mutual security plan. In a statement issued on 11 October, the group urged the Security Council to convene a special session to deal with the civil war in

Afghanistan. The Presidents also called for an Islamic conference to be convened jointly by the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to coordinate efforts to end the Afghan conflict.

35. The "Shanghai five" group (now the "Shanghai forum" group), comprising China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan, at its summit meeting in Dushanbe on 5 July, called for an end to the Afghan conflict, expressed concern over tensions in Afghanistan and discussed means of countering terrorism originating from that country. The Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan convened an emergency summit meeting in Bishkek on 20 August to address security issues in the aftermath of an infiltration earlier in the month by armed Uzbek groups into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which they believed had originated in Afghanistan.

36. In mid-May, Taliban Interior Minister Mullah Abdur Razzaq paid an official visit to Islamabad to hold discussions with Pakistani authorities on the extradition of criminals, terrorism, drug trafficking and the Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement. At that time Pakistan handed over a list of 18 camps inside Afghanistan where Pakistani militants allegedly receive military training and demanded the closure of those camps and the extradition of those suspected of terrorist activities in Pakistan. Taliban authorities have reportedly sought over 100 million dollars worth of assistance from Pakistan for rehabilitation projects.

37. In a development that added another source of regional concern related to Afghanistan, it was reported that in early May Jumaboi Namangani, an Uzbek dissident, had crossed with his armed followers from Tajikistan into Taliban-held territory in northern Afghanistan. An official Taliban radio broadcast called the allegation baseless since such an act would contravene their foreign policy principles. There have also been persistent reports of the involvement of a substantial number of Arabs, Chechens, Pakistanis, Uighurs and other outsiders fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban have similarly denied these allegations.

38. To my grave concern, this year has seen the continued targeting and killing of Afghan leaders for political reasons. The Taliban-appointed Governor of Kunduz Province, Aref Khan, as well as other Afghans were slain in the Pakistani city of Peshawar. In none of

these cases has a suspect been identified or apprehended by Pakistani law enforcement forces. provisioned in resolution 1267 (1999) went into effect on 14 November 1999.

Contacts between individual States and Afghan parties

39. Since the beginning of 2000, numerous Iranian technical delegations have visited Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan with the stated purpose of inspecting and assessing the damage suffered by their diplomatic facilities in the cities of Herat and Kabul. Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has yet to receive what it considers a satisfactory reply from the Taliban to its demand for the apprehension and extradition or punishment of those responsible for the killing of Iranian diplomats and a journalist in Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998, the border post between Islam Qaleh and Do Ghalun, reopened in the autumn of 1999, has remained open for trade throughout 2000 and the Iranian Consulate in Herat has reopened.

40. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Ugo Intini, visited the two warring sides in late September in an attempt to create a "humanitarian corridor" between the war-divided territories of Afghanistan. Mr. Intini had discussed the initiative with Taliban Foreign Minister Mutawakkil and United Front Commander Massoud, in Kabul and Dushanbe, respectively.

41. Recent weeks have seen the initiation of contacts between Uzbekistan and the Taliban through their ambassadors in Islamabad. At their second meeting, on 15 October, a letter was delivered from Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, addressed to President Karimov, assuring non-interference in the internal affairs of Uzbekistan. A third meeting took place on 18 October, at which agreement was reportedly reached on stepping up the level of diplomatic contact to that of deputy foreign minister. Following a meeting on 7 November between the Chief Executive of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, and the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan, Kasymzhomart Tokayev, the latter stated that in the future the Taliban would most likely have a dominating role in a coalition government in Afghanistan.

42. On 9 October, a private airline company, Flying Dolphin, based in the United Arab Emirates, inaugurated a weekly flight between the cities Sharjah and Kandahar. This is the first commercial airline to operate in and out of Afghanistan since the sanctions

C. Initiatives taken by Afghans and Member States

Rome process

43. As decided at a meeting in Rome in November 1999, supporters of the *loya jirga* initiative, led by former King Zahir Shah, the so-called "Rome process", dispatched delegations to United Nations Headquarters, Washington, D.C., Paris, Berlin, London, Islamabad and Kandahar to explain their activities and to seek support. My Personal Representative met in Islamabad with two separate delegations visiting Pakistan and the Taliban in the context of the proposal to convene an emergency *loya jirga*. The former King also intends to dispatch delegations to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Central Asian republics, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia, as well as to the United Front.

Other processes and efforts

44. A representative of a parallel initiative known as the "Cyprus process" visited New York to explain its activities. On 15 September, this group convened its fourth meeting in Cyprus, at which the mechanism to convene a grand national assembly inside Afghanistan was discussed. Over 70 Afghan intellectuals participated in the two-day conference, to which the United Nations and a number of Member States sent observers. While invitations were extended to both the Taliban and the United Front, neither sent a representative to the gathering. From 4 to 6 October, the Council for Peace and National Unity of Afghanistan, a group which has links with the Rome process, convened in Bonn, with the assistance of the German Government, to discuss practical ways to accelerate the convening of an emergency *loya jirga*, in accordance with the peace initiative of the ex-King Zahir Shah.

Initiative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference

45. As mentioned in my previous reports, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mohammed Khatami, in his capacity as Chairman of OIC, launched a diplomatic initiative in February 2000. OIC invited the United Front and the Taliban to Jeddah, Saudi

Arabia, for two rounds of separate talks with the OIC mission, from 7 to 9 March and again from 8 to 10 May, with a view to convening eventual face-to-face negotiations between the two sides. My Personal Representative attended these meetings on behalf of the United Nations as an observer. Prior to the first meeting I met personally with the members of an OIC delegation when they visited New York on 1 March to explain the initiative.

46. The OIC talks concluded with an agreement for a comprehensive exchange of prisoners of war between the two sides, to be conducted through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). To my regret, the process for the prisoner exchange was interrupted by the fighting that broke out early in July. Nevertheless, the two sides have continued with an informal exchange of smaller groups of prisoners.

Initiative by Turkmenistan

47. In late August, the Special Envoy for Afghanistan of the President of Turkmenistan, Boris Shikhmuradov, who had earlier visited the Islamic Republic of Iran, paid a visit to Kandahar to meet Mullah Omar and subsequently travelled to Islamabad where he was received by General Musharraf. Later, Mr. Shikhmuradov proceeded to Dushanbe to hold talks with Ahmad Shah Massoud. During his discussions with the two belligerents, the Turkmen envoy suggested that the two sides agree to a long-term ceasefire, proposing Massoud be given authority to run the north-eastern sector of the country in return for accepting the overall authority of the "Islamic Emirate" in Afghanistan. It would appear that both the Taliban and the United Front declined the suggestion.

D. Activities of the "six plus two" group and the Group of Twenty-One

48. My Personal Representative held a meeting of the "six plus two" group in Islamabad on 22 May. On 30 May, he convened another meeting in Islamabad of the Group of Twenty-One, a larger group of Governments with influence in Afghanistan, which had not met since June 1998. The Group of Twenty-One comprises China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uzbekistan, as well as OIC.

49. In the light of the intensifying fighting and the worsening humanitarian situation, I decided to convene a meeting of the "six plus two" group on 15 September at the level of foreign ministers. The meeting, the second of its kind following the first ministerial meeting in September 1998, ended with the adoption of a statement (A/55/393-S/2000/875, annex), requesting my Personal Representative to enter into contact with all relevant Afghan parties and to report back to the group on the outcome of his contacts.

50. As agreed at the 15 September meeting, the "six plus two" group held another meeting, this time at the level of deputy foreign ministers, on 3 November, in order to receive a report from my Personal Representative on his contacts with all relevant Afghan parties regarding their willingness to agree to a ceasefire and enter into negotiations to bring about a political solution in Afghanistan. In its concluding statement (see annex), the group welcomed the written agreement communicated by the two warring parties in letters to my Personal Representative to enter into a process of dialogue, without preconditions and through the intermediation of the Secretary-General or his Personal Representative, aimed at achieving a political solution to the conflict. The group in particular noted the commitment of the two sides to negotiate in good faith and not to unilaterally abandon the negotiating process until the agenda, to be agreed by the two sides, has been exhausted. It requested my Personal Representative to report to the group by 1 February 2001 on the progress achieved in the process of dialogue by the two warring factions.

51. Based on the particular interest of the "six plus two" group, a meeting was convened on 28 February in New York in order to discuss the issue of illicit drugs emanating from Afghanistan. The meeting, which was also attended by senior counter-narcotics experts from the capitals of the "six plus two" group members, was co-chaired by Kieran Prendergast, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and Pino Arlacchi, Executive Director of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention. The subsequent activities of the group in this regard will be described in the humanitarian section of the present report.

IV. Humanitarian activities and human rights

52. The conditions under which assistance is provided in Afghanistan have become progressively more complicated as the year has progressed. The principles of assistance programming, as defined by the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan, have been regularly challenged by actions taken by the Taliban authorities. Throughout, the assistance community has maintained its commitment to the people of Afghanistan through the provision of assistance while at the same time continuing dialogue with the Taliban authorities. However, issues of principle remain, such as the restriction on the employment of Afghan women by the United Nations and NGOs outside the health sector, as well as the contents of a statute issued by the Taliban authorities which lays out regulations governing the activities of United Nations agencies and programmes. Both constitute major setbacks in the process of constructive engagement with the Taliban. The United Nations has made it clear to the authorities that discrimination on the basis of gender is unacceptable. The United Nations humanitarian community, under the leadership of the Coordinator's office, and with the assistance of Member States through the Afghanistan Support Group, continues to seek acceptable resolution of these issues.

53. The provision of assistance to Afghans by the United Nations and by international and national NGOs has, for the second year, followed a principled approach consistent with the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan. The assistance community attempts to make best use of all available resources through a principled common programme. The programme, presented in the Consolidated Appeal for 2000, addresses the priority needs to: (a) alleviate human suffering; (b) protect and advance human rights; (c) provide minimum basic social services; (d) build sustainable livelihoods by empowering Afghans; and (e) support the return of refugees. To date, the international community has provided approximately \$150 million, of which \$140 million was in direct response to the needs presented within the framework of the Consolidated Appeal, representing 48 per cent of the total requested.

54. In some parts of the country, implementation of assistance programmes has been hampered by restrictions on access to those in need of humanitarian

assistance and constrained by high levels of insecurity. Although the United Nations was able to negotiate a cross-line operation to provide for some 60,000 conflict-related displaced in the Panjshir Valley in early December 1999, no further agreements were obtained from the authorities for the continuation of such operations during 2000. Similar difficulties were experienced in obtaining access to the communities in northern Hazarajat affected by conflict, drought and economic blockade during the second quarter of the year, although the authorities did allow for some assistance to reach those in Samangan and Dar-e-souf during August. The United Nations Coordinator's office continues to advocate that the authorities give greater respect to the right of civilians to humanitarian assistance.

55. Security conditions away from the frontlines and zones of conflict have been adequate for the implementation of humanitarian programmes, although volatility remains. However, the tragic murder in August of seven Afghan workers of the United Nations-supported mine awareness programme by an unidentified armed band in western Afghanistan confirmed the everyday risks faced by humanitarian personnel.

56. Socio-economic conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated significantly. A combination of the war economy, the effects of drought and restrictions on transit trade with Pakistan are compounding the vulnerability of the majority of Afghans. The prolonged conflict and the resultant anarchy has left hundreds of thousands of Afghans chronically dependent on international assistance for their survival. The provision of food, shelter, health care and other services by the assistance community is recognized as an essential lifeline for many.

57. Those displaced by fighting, and recently by the effects of the drought, are of particular concern to the humanitarian community; the most vulnerable are being supported by food provided by the World Food Programme (WFP). Populations displaced by fighting in 1999 remain in Kabul, the Panjshir Valley and in various locations in the north and east of the country. Ongoing fighting in the central and northern regions is adding to these numbers. Approximately 134,000 displaced persons are in a situation of acute vulnerability as a consequence of conflict. Their critical needs are being addressed by emergency

assistance programmes implemented by NGOs supported and coordinated by the United Nations.

58. As predicted in reports at the end of 1999, the combination of successive dry winters and strict border controls has exacerbated food insecurity for most Afghans. The current drought conditions are considered the worst in 40 years and have affected both crop and livestock production dramatically. The crop assessment reports of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and WFP estimate cereal production for 2000 at 1.82 million metric tons, representing a reduction of 44 per cent relative to 1999 and 53 per cent relative to 1998. Reduced fodder availability, water shortages and distress sales have decreased animal holdings by 50 to 100 per cent across the country. FAO estimates that 300,000 metric tons of wheat seed is planted annually in Afghanistan. This year there is an estimated minimum deficit of 60,000 metric tons of seed as a result of either widespread production failure, forced consumption for food or poorly formed grains that will not germinate.

59. In June, the United Nations and its partners presented a funding request to implement a strategy to address the additional needs caused by the drought. The strategy focused on providing assistance in situ to the most vulnerable populations in order to stabilize communities and avoid migration. The success of the strategy has been contingent on access and the extent to which additional resources have been made available by donors. In September, a large number of families from the severely drought-affected and remote districts of Ghor, Badghis and Faryab provinces began to arrive in Herat, the main urban centre in the west. Currently, some 40,000 people displaced by drought are in Herat. The assistance community is mobilizing all available resources to cater for their shelter, food, water and sanitation needs. There is disturbing evidence that more people are leaving their homes in a desperate attempt to survive the effects of the drought. While food has been made available, the lack of cash for non-food items and support for food assistance programmes are hampering the response effort. The international donor community is urged to respond generously to the requests of the United Nations and its partners to limit the extent of this crisis.

60. In addition to the emergency food aid provided in response to need caused by drought, WFP has allotted a total of 115,800 tons of food commodities for around

1.5 million food-insecure people. WFP assistance focused on the urban poor living in Kabul, Jalalabad and Mazar. Around 485,000 people, mostly from female-headed households and the disabled, are regularly provided with highly subsidized breads.

61. Early this year, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) successfully negotiated an agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran for the repatriation of Afghan refugees. Since the implementation of the joint programme in April, forcible return of Afghan refugees from the Islamic Republic of Iran has decreased drastically to several thousands (from 70,000 in 1999) and contributed significantly to increased protection of Afghan refugees who are unable or unwilling to return. On the other hand, the number of Afghan refugees who returned voluntarily from Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran has doubled compared to 1999. Between January and the end of September 2000, a total of 170,000 Afghan refugees returned voluntarily with the assistance of UNHCR, WFP and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (70,000 from Pakistan, 100,000 from the Islamic Republic of Iran). Repatriation to drought-affected areas and zones of conflict has not been encouraged.

62. Initial reintegration assistance has been provided on a continual basis throughout 2000. This has included the provision of transport, individual household support, potable water and emergency shelter construction, in addition to programmes of education, health and income generation. This support has specifically targeted women and other vulnerable segments of the returnee population.

63. The United Nations specialized agencies, along with NGO partners, have conducted priority health activities throughout 2000. These include human resource development, integrated disease control activities and safe motherhood and water and sanitation programmes. Unprecedented outbreaks of meningitis and falciparum malaria related to climatic changes were seen in the central highlands, while hemorrhagic fever reported in the west was likely associated with animal flocks displaced due to the drought. Responding to these outbreaks from contingency supplies with simultaneous negligible donations of emergency medical aid has meant that the current response capacity cannot cope with the threat of expanding populations of internally displaced persons in the west, due to the drought, and in the north due to the conflict.

64. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), WHO and a wide range of NGOs supported the national immunization days during May and June and October and November 2000. During the spring round about 5.3 million children under 5 were vaccinated against polio, the highest coverage since 1994. WHO has also carried out malaria and tuberculosis control programmes.

65. The Poverty Eradication and Community Empowerment Programme of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assumes a direct and an indirect correlation between peace-building and conflict prevention on the one hand and community empowerment and poverty eradication on the other. Operating in both rural and urban environments, in line with traditional Afghan social structures, the programme has successfully established and strengthened over 2,000 multiethnic community-based organizations and interest groups that have formed sustainable linkages in terms of reconciliation, peace-building, good governance and refugee reintegration. Implementing projects through the United Nations Office for Project Services, FAO and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), the programme has contributed substantially to the aid community's collective efforts in the field of food security, access to basic social services and to livelihood opportunities.

66. Afghanistan continues to rank as one of the most severely landmine-contaminated countries in the world. Currently, 720 square kilometres of land are known to contain landmines. Out of this, 340 square kilometres are considered as high priority mined areas, which have a direct adverse impact on the lives of the Afghan population, while the remaining 380 square kilometres are in low priority areas. Assessment of the landmine and unexploded ordnance threat is continuous and ongoing.

67. Since its inception in 1989 and as at October, the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan has been able to clear 518 square kilometres of mined and battlefield areas contaminated by unexploded ordnance. Of the total areas cleared, 79 square kilometres were cleared in 2000 alone. There have also been significant inroads in the survey of mine and battlefield areas; over 619 square kilometres have been covered. Mine awareness training and materials have been provided to over 6.8 million Afghans.

68. Funding for mine action peaked in 1998, allowing for continued programme growth, but decreased substantially in 1999 and 2000. The severe shortfall of \$3.5 million for the activities of the Mine Action Programme for the period from September through December 2000 forced the programme to suspend its staff on two months' leave without pay and to freeze staff salaries and increments. As a further consequence, only 64 per cent of the sites targeted for clearance will be cleared in 2000.

Narcotics

69. Afghanistan remains the world's largest supplier of opium. While the area under opium poppy cultivation had doubled in the 1998/99 season as compared to the previous year, this year's survey shows a slight decline of 10 per cent from 91,000 hectares in 1999 to around 82,000 hectares this year. This figure, however, does not live up to the Taliban decree of September 1999 to reduce opium poppy cultivation by one third in the 1999/00 planting season.

70. This year's harvest, on the other hand, has fallen by 28 per cent from a record of 4,581 tons of opium in 1999 to 3,275 tons this year, mainly due to the severe drought. The cultivation of opium poppy is concentrated in fairly distinct areas of Afghanistan, with 92 per cent of opium poppy cultivation in only six of Afghanistan's 30 provinces. An alternative development pilot programme of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention has focused on three target areas and has reduced the opium harvest this year by 50 per cent in Ghorak, Khakrez and Maiwand districts. This has demonstrated that alternative development is the right strategy for illicit crop reduction in the Afghan context. Lack of funds for the alternative development pilot programme may lead to a lack of credibility in the future and jeopardize the sustainability of the poppy reduction achieved in the target districts in 2000.

71. Meanwhile, on 28 July 2000, the Taliban supreme leader, Mullah Omar, issued a total ban on opium poppy cultivation in the forthcoming planting season. The Taliban authorities have declared that Afghanistan's drug problems could only be solved if the international community assisted in the implementation of the decree.

72. Given the continuing war in Afghanistan, it is recognized that institutional support for law

enforcement within the country is not practicable. However, since the increasing drug trafficking from Afghanistan poses a serious global threat, the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention has initiated a drug law enforcement programme in the countries around Afghanistan, a "security belt", aimed at containing at the regional level a problem having its source in Afghanistan. This is being achieved through the promotion of coordinated drug control efforts by China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which surround Afghanistan along a 5,000 kilometre border.

73. The commitment of the "six plus two" group to address the illicit drug problem in Afghanistan and its implications for the region and beyond was also demonstrated at the "six plus two" high-level meeting in New York on 28 February 2000. The President of the Security Council subsequently encouraged the "six plus two" group to address drug-related issues in a coordinated manner, with the support of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention. It also urged other Member States to help strengthen the drug control capacities of countries bordering Afghanistan.

74. In May, the Office, experts from the "six plus two" group and donor countries met in Vienna to endorse the formulation of a regional action plan intended to promote an exchange of information, the interdiction of cross-border drug shipments and control of chemicals used to produce drugs, as well as the elimination of illicit crops in Afghanistan and subsequent alternative development activities. The United Nations common programming approach in Afghanistan was particularly emphasized as an appropriate framework to ensure that assistance was consistent with the goal of opium poppy elimination. The regional action plan was approved by the "six plus two" group at its meeting in New York on 13 September.

Human rights

75. During this past year, Afghans have continued to suffer a wide range of deprivations, violations, policies and practices that severely restrict or deny their human rights. The war continues to be the most harmful and significant factor impinging on the rights of Afghans. The accumulated and direct effects of conflict, compounded by extreme poverty and profound underdevelopment, contribute to a situation that has

resulted in Afghans being amongst those who are least able to enjoy their rights, including the right to life.

76. I have pointed to the alarming statistics and socio-economic indicators that provide some insight into the limited enjoyment of human rights by Afghans in previous reports. The drought, coupled with conflict and crippling poverty, has, without question, exacerbated an already bad situation, particularly in terms of the right to food, health and adequate shelter. The need to cut back on mine action activities due to inadequate funding is likely to further threaten the right to life of mine-affected communities.

77. Policies and practices that are widespread in Afghanistan, particularly in relation to women and girls, are a continuous cause of grave concern. As indicated in my previous reports, the situation of women and girls remained dismal, due to both the unconscionable policies of the Taliban and the general decline in socio-economic indicators. The firman issued by the Taliban authorities in July restricting the employment of Afghan women by the United Nations and NGOs, with the exception of the health sector, is a clear violation of the right to work and to an adequate standard of living. This firman constitutes an unacceptable precedent and undermines the ability of aid agencies to reach those who are most vulnerable and marginalized in Afghan society. The United Nations Human Rights Coordinator, in consultation with the aid community, is pursuing this matter with the Taliban authorities. Aid agencies continue to pursue activities specifically designed to address the problem as well as the ramifications of gender discrimination.

78. Afghans in frontline areas have been subjected repeatedly to indiscriminate bombing and the indiscriminate use of landmines. Populations from frontline communities have fled in large numbers from each battle zone, as civilians are all too aware that their rights as non-combatants are frequently violated. Gross violations of human rights include summary executions, including an alleged mass killing of detainees in Samangan in May. Civilians, including women, have been arbitrarily detained in conditions that are described as cruel and inhumane. There are numerous reports of Taliban troops deliberately destroying, burning and looting homes and assets essential for survival. The deliberate targeting and harming of civilians has a long history in the Afghan conflict and points to the urgent need to hold accountable those who are responsible for such heinous

crimes. Reports about summary executions, arbitrary detention and forced labour of those in detention camps remain of great concern.

79. It can only be regretted that the Taliban movement continues to deny access to the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Kamal Hossain. His latest report (A/55/346) highlights the alarming situation regarding human rights in Afghanistan.

V. Observations and conclusions

80. This has been an exceptionally difficult year for most Afghans. The country is facing a combination of war, with its direct and accumulated effects, widespread poverty exacerbated by the worst drought in 30 years, continued gross violations of human rights, and the destruction and criminalization of the economy, with the result that most Afghans are reduced to eking out a "bare bones" existence. The situation is likely to deteriorate dramatically over the winter months and throughout next year.

81. Developments in Afghanistan throughout 2000 have given little ground for optimism. Once again, we have witnessed with dreary familiarity a major military offensive late this past summer, with all the consequent displacement and suffering of the civilian population. And once again, I must note the continued involvement on the side of each warring faction of external players of various sorts. It is deeply distressing that a significant number of non-Afghan personnel, largely from Pakistani *madrassahs*, are not only taking active part in the fighting, most, if not all, on the side of the Taliban, and there also appears to be outside involvement in the planning and logistical support of their military operations. This as well as other forms of interference by certain governments in the internal affairs of Afghanistan enable and encourage both factions to pursue their military aims.

82. The recent Taliban decree imposing, for the first time, a total ban on opium poppy cultivation in the territory under its control is an encouraging development that deserves a positive response. However, this step was offset by other actions of the Taliban such as the edict against the employment of Afghan women. It is most regrettable to note that despite some limited improvements, women and girls

have continued to face serious abuses of their fundamental rights, including severe restrictions imposed on their participation in public life.

83. I deeply deplore the Taliban's failure so far to comply, one year after its adoption, with the Security Council's demand that it turn over Osama bin Laden under the terms laid down in paragraph 2 of resolution 1267 (1999). Nor has any progress been apparent in the investigation of the murders of the Iranian diplomatic and consular staff in Mazar-e-Sharif. I also regret that no visible progress has been achieved in the past year towards bringing the perpetrators of the murder of Lieutenant Colonel Calo, the military adviser of the Special Mission, to trial.

84. The United Nations country team for Afghanistan and its NGO partners continue their efforts to alleviate the problems faced by the Afghan people and to provide the needed assistance to improve the dire humanitarian situation. However, funding for the Consolidated Appeal for Afghanistan, and specifically for the drought appeal, has reached only around 50 per cent of the amount needed. The critically important mine clearance and anti-narcotics programmes have also been affected by inadequate funding. I call again upon the international community to respond generously in order to safeguard the continuation of this vital work.

85. The agreement by the Taliban and the United Front on 2 November to enter into a process of dialogue without preconditions, under United Nations auspices, in order to bring to an end the Afghan conflict by political means, provides a glimmer of hope in this otherwise grim scenario. While skepticism as to its long-term perspective may be warranted, given the past record of false beginnings and dashed hopes, the agreement does mark the first time that the two warring sides have committed themselves in writing to seek a political settlement through an uninterrupted process of negotiations under United Nations auspices from which neither side is to withdraw until all the items on the agenda, to be agreed by themselves, have been exhausted.

86. The agreement is purely procedural in nature and thus constitutes only a first step in what will be at best a long and difficult journey towards peace. For it to develop the required momentum and have a chance of success, I must count on the support of the Security Council and the General Assembly, not to mention the

authentic cooperation of the "six plus two" group. Only in this way, and through a carefully calibrated and timely mix of incentives and disincentives, will it be possible to generate and sustain the necessary political will within the two parties, help them overcome their deep mutual mistrust and motivate them to proceed with due flexibility and speed in addressing the issues that lie at the core of the Afghan conflict. One such incentive ought to be the elaboration of a plan by the international financial and development institutions, with the support of donor countries, for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Such an initiative would provide the Afghans with a ray of hope for a better future and also help ensure the durability of any peace settlement.

87. I am pleased to note that the atmosphere within the "six plus two" group has markedly improved in the course of the year, even if much remains to be done to ensure greater cohesion among its members. The regional action plan on drugs that has been adopted by the "six plus two" group is a useful step towards achieving the political cohesion among its members essential for the ultimate objective of the group — to help settle the Afghan conflict through political negotiations. My Personal Representative and I shall endeavour, in our contacts, to foster a realization that their legitimate interests in Afghanistan will best be served by simultaneously ending their support for one or the other faction and by encouraging the establishment of a unified government in Afghanistan that is a genuine reflection of the aspirations of the Afghan people. Throughout history, countries in the region enjoyed peace and prosperity only when Afghanistan was peaceful under a unified government and could play its natural role as a bridge between the countries of south, west and central Asia.

88. Any lasting settlement must also involve the participation of non-belligerent Afghans, from both inside and outside Afghanistan, for the shaping of Afghanistan's future cannot be left solely to those who brandish weapons. In this context, I greatly value the initiative by the former King, Zahir Shah, whose figure is held in high regard in Afghanistan, to convene an emergency *loya jirga* inside the country as a means of mobilizing and giving voice to important sectors of the Afghan population.

89. This year has seen a considerable strengthening of UNSMA's role and presence on the ground in Afghanistan. UNSMA, with its full complement of

political officers on board, has opened a liaison office in Tehran and re-established its political presence in Kabul. Both offices are headed by senior political officers. The political work of the Special Mission is likely to increase in the months to come, particularly if, as we must hope, the current efforts being pursued by my Personal Representative evolve into substantive negotiations. At that point UNSMA would have to develop a sharply increased diplomatic capacity and it is for this purpose that I intend to strengthen the Mission's political staff.

90. While I regret the refusal of the Taliban authorities to receive the Special Rapporteur, I am gratified that the Civil Affairs Unit is now in place and functioning and has been able to count on the cooperation of both warring sides. It has quickly proved its usefulness, both in terms of building a relationship of trust with provincial and local authorities as well as other local leaders, and of apprising the Head of Mission of developments in Afghanistan, including human rights aspects. The Unit should reach its full strength by the beginning of 2001 and will be tasked to pay particular attention to strengthening its ties with Afghan civil society in the year ahead.

91. Throughout the year, UNSMA's military component has succeeded in establishing solid contacts with the military authorities of both warring factions, as well as providing reliable and informative support to the Head of Mission. I should like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Brigadier General Jan Gunnar Isberg (Sweden), who has just left the Mission after one year's service as Senior Military Adviser, for his dedication, hard work and initiative. It is in view of the benefits brought to the Mission by the fruitful interaction between its political and military components that I intend to revert to the situation that prevailed until late last year, by increasing the number of military advisers from two to four.

92. While there has been a measure of attention paid to Afghanistan this year, the tendency persists to see Afghanistan as a series of compartmentalized problems, be they narcotics, terrorism or refugees, and to seek to solve them in isolation rather than through a comprehensive approach. It is to be hoped that the Security Council and the General Assembly will set for themselves clear and achievable objectives in Afghanistan and that their resolutions and decisions will be guided by the principle of effectiveness in

achieving those goals and taken in the context of, rather than being a substitute for, a comprehensive strategy to bring about a lasting solution to the Afghan conflict.

Annex

Statement of the "six plus two" group

3 November 2000

A high-level meeting of the "six plus two" group took place on 3 November 2000 at United Nations Headquarters, as agreed by their Foreign Ministers and other senior representatives at their high-level meeting on 15 September 2000, to receive a report from the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General on his contacts with all relevant Afghan parties regarding their willingness to agree to a ceasefire and enter into negotiations to bring about a political solution in Afghanistan.

The members of the "six plus two" group took note of the contacts established during this period by the Personal Representative with the Taliban and the United Front, as well as with non-belligerent Afghan groups. They welcomed the written agreement communicated by the two warring parties in letters to the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to enter into a process of dialogue, without preconditions and through the intermediation of the Secretary-General or his Personal Representative, aimed at achieving a political solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. They in particular noted the commitment of the two sides to negotiate in good faith and not to unilaterally abandon the negotiating process until the negotiating agenda has been exhausted.

The "six plus two" members remained committed to a peaceful political settlement of the Afghan conflict, in accordance with relevant provisions of resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations. They urged the two parties to cooperate closely with the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General in moving the process forward in its shortest possible time and expressed renewed commitment to continue to work closely with and in support of the Secretary-General and his Personal Representative to assist in establishing a meaningful agenda that will address the issues at the core of the Afghan conflict. They expressed grave concern about the recent offensives in Afghanistan and the negative humanitarian consequences, and reiterated that there is no military solution. They encouraged other efforts, particularly those of the Afghan people, in support of United Nations activities to achieve a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan.

The signatories to the Tashkent Declaration on Fundamental Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict in Afghanistan (A/54/174-S/1999/812, annex) reaffirmed the principles contained in that Declaration and reiterated that its realization would contribute significantly to the promotion of peace in Afghanistan. Turkmenistan expressed its dissenting position.

The "six plus two" group requested the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to report to the group by 1 February 2001 on the progress achieved in the process of dialogue agreed by the two warring sides.

**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.: General
20 November 2000

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
**Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East
Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory**

Security Council
Fifty-fifth year

**Identical letters dated 20 November 2000 from the Permanent
Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

Israel, the occupying Power, used helicopter gunships and warships to launch massive bombardments of Gaza City and other locations in the Gaza Strip around 6 p.m. local time today, 20 November 2000. Scores of Israeli missiles hit locations of the Palestinian Authority, including a police station and the headquarters of the preventive security. They also hit a building of Fatah, the mainstream political party in Palestine. These raids caused injury to approximately 50 Palestinians, knocked out electricity in parts of Gaza City and caused the vast destruction of property as well as causing serious panic among the whole population there.

Israel declares that these military attacks were in response to the explosion of a roadside bomb, which was detonated near an illegal Israeli settlement in Gaza in the path of a bus, killing two and wounding nine Israeli settlers. The Israeli use of such huge lethal military force was carried out despite the fact that the Palestinian side denied responsibility for the bombing and opened an investigation into the incident despite the continuous loss of Palestinian lives at the hands of Israeli soldiers.

In this regard, and in follow-up to my previous letters, dated from 29 September to 17 November 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921; A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/41-S/2000/1046; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104), since my last letter to you and as of yesterday, 19 November, the Israeli occupying forces have killed 10 more Palestinians, bringing the total number of Palestinian deaths to 215. (The names of the martyrs since my last letter are annexed.)

The Israeli air attacks of today, reminiscent of the air raids on Gaza and Ramallah on 12 October 2000, represent a new and extremely dangerous escalation of the bloody Israeli campaign against the Palestinian people. Since 25 October



2000, Palestine has repeatedly been calling on the Security Council to take action aimed at bringing an end to this Israeli campaign and to provide impartial international protection for the Palestinian civilian population in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. The Council has not acted, however, since the adoption of resolution 1322 (2000) on 7 October 2000.

The Palestinian death toll has been mounting, as have the number of injuries and the amount of destruction throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. There is now a new Israeli escalation of lethal force, which might drag us all into a very different and more dangerous situation. In this regard, we still hope that the Council will act, and act promptly, in fulfilment of its obligation to maintain international peace and security.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Nasser **Al-Kidwa**

Ambassador

Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

**Annex to the identical letters dated 20 November 2000 from the
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

**Names of the martyrs killed by Israeli security forces in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem (Friday,
17 November to Sunday, 19 November 2000)**

Friday, 17 November 2000

1. Khalid Abdullah Salama
2. Haseed Mohammed Haseed Friewan
3. Mahmoud Zeid Samour
4. Mohammed Abdel Jalil Abu Rayan (14 years old)
5. Rami Imad Yassin
6. Hamza Abdel Mo'tee Shkhedem

Saturday, 18 November 2000

1. Baha Al-Deen Abu Saeed

Sunday, 19 November 2000

1. Abdel Rahman Ziad Al-Dahshan (14 years old)
2. Ra'faat Muhib Jouda
3. Nasser Ahmed Al-Najar

**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.: General
20 November 2000

Original: English

**General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 164**

**Security Council
Fifty-fifth year**

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

**Letter dated 20 November 2000 from the Permanent
Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General**

I wish to draw your attention to a reprehensible act of terrorism that was perpetrated today near Kfar Darom, south of Gaza.

Just past 7.30 a.m. local time, a bus carrying 30 schoolchildren and their chaperones left Kfar Darom heading towards a school in nearby Gush Katif. About 300 metres outside Kfar Darom, a bomb was exploded by three Palestinian terrorists. Two civilians, Miriam Amitai, a teacher, and Gavriel Biton, a maintenance person at the school, were killed in the attack. At least 10 others were injured, including children as young as 7 years of age, some of them critically. This heinous assault, which deliberately targeted innocent children, was carried out by members of the Tanzim paramilitary group from the circles closest to Chairman Arafat.

The Government of Israel holds the Palestinian Authority fully responsible for this attack. The international community has the responsibility to call upon Chairman Arafat to fulfil his obligations to halt attacks against innocent civilians and to disarm the Tanzim. Terrorist attacks and bombings aimed at Israelis have continued unabated, in violation of the Sharm Al-Sheikh understanding and other key agreements, which require Chairman Arafat to act immediately to bring about their cessation.

Regrettably, this recent act of terror serves as proof of Arafat's lack of credibility in claiming to combat Palestinian violence. We renew our call to the Palestinian leadership to comply with their repeated commitments to halt the terrorism and violence and to resume negotiations to achieve a peaceful and lasting settlement.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 164, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Lancry
Permanent Representative



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
21 November 2000
English
Original: Arabic

**Letter dated 21 November 2000 from the Permanent
Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council**

I have the honour to refer to the letter of 20 November 2000 which you addressed to His Excellency the Ambassador of Palestine concerning the escalation by the occupation forces in Palestine of their aggression against the Gaza Strip by means of air attacks. They used about 50 rockets, which not only injured more than 50 Palestinians and completely destroyed the government installations of the Palestinian Authority but also severed the electricity supply in many parts of the Gaza Strip.

Since those new acts of aggression reflect the continued determination of the occupation forces to use military force in an unacceptable manner, and since the deteriorating situation is a threat to the stability of the whole region, especially in view of the collective punishment being applied against the Palestinian people in violation of all international instruments, as Chairman of the Arab Group, I request the urgent convening of the Security Council to consider the serious developments described and the measures which the Council ought to take to ensure the protection of the Palestinian people.

(Signed) Abuzed Omar **Dorda**
Ambassador

Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Chairman of the Arab Group



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
21 November 2000
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 19 November 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you of the following acts of piracy and aggression committed by United States and Kuwaiti forces in the Arabian Gulf:

1. On 13 September 2000 United States naval forces on station in the northern part of the Arabian Gulf seized the Riyadh Company freighter *Al-Mustafa* and escorted it to the port of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates, where the vessel and its cargo were impounded.
2. On 30 September 2000 United States naval forces intercepted the Iraqi vessel *Oman II*. A gunboat carrying 12 armed men was sent to the vessel, and they boarded it, searched it, examined its logs and inquired about quantities of fuel. The instruments and equipment on the bridge were photographed, and the course navigated by the vessel was determined. On the following day, 1 October 2000, a Marine force of some 14 men in full gear boarded the vessel and inspected its cargo. The search lasted for almost six hours before the vessel was allowed to head for the port at Umm Qasr.
3. On 25 October 2000 an Iraqi vessel was intercepted by the Kuwaiti craft *Faylakah*, a tugboat and a coast guard cutter and taken into the port of Shu'aybah, south of Kuwait City.

The acts of piracy and aggression committed by United States naval forces, which are stationed in the Arabian Gulf against the will of the peoples of the region, represent a serious threat to regional and international peace and security.

I request you to intervene with the Government of the United States of America and with the Kuwaiti regime with a view to inducing them to desist forthwith from these hostile practices, which are to be regarded as in breach of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law. In accordance with the principle of international responsibility, I affirm the legally established right of the Republic of Iraq to claim compensation for the damage done to it by these acts of aggression.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. Hasan
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
22 November 2000

Original: English

**Letter dated 22 November 2000 from the Permanent
Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed
to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour, in my capacity as Chairman of the Ninth Islamic Summit Conference, and in compliance with the Final Communiqué of the Summit at which a Ministerial Committee was formed, to request Your Excellency to convene an urgent meeting, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian Question", between the Security Council and the Ministerial Committee, whose members are as follows, on Monday, 27 November 2000:

Chairman:

His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani
Foreign Minister of the State of Qatar

Members of the Committee:

His Excellency Dr. Kamal Kharrazi
Foreign Minister of the State of the Islamic Republic of Iran


His Excellency Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar
Foreign Minister of Malaysia

His Excellency Mr. Mohamad Benaissa
Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Morocco

His Excellency Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Gadio
Foreign Minister of the Republic of Senegal
The Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference

I should be grateful if you can confirm the requested meeting as soon as possible.

(Signed) Nassir Abdulaziz Al Nasser
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
24 November 2000

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**Letter dated 24 November 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 22 November 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2000/1111), requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council with the Ministerial Committee of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to consider the deteriorating situation in Palestine, on Monday, 27 November 2000. Malaysia, as a member of the delegation of the Ministerial Committee of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, fully supports the request that has been made by the Permanent Representative of Qatar. In this regard, I would be very grateful if you could kindly make the necessary arrangements for the convening of that meeting.

(Signed) **Mohammad Kamal Yahaya**
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

